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This dissertation investigates whether firms strategically disclose accounting 
restatements by coordinating restatement announcements with earnings releases, 
delaying the announcement of income-decreasing restatements, or obscuring 
restatement announcements by failing to disclose news of a restatement on a Form 8-
K filing.  I examine restatements announced after a Securities and Exchange 
Commission rule (effective August 24, 2004) that mandates a unique 8-K filing for 
restatements.  Consistent with an attempt to lessen the negative impact of a 
restatement announcement, I find that when firms package restatement 
announcements with earnings releases they most often pair small income-decreasing 
restatements with positive earnings surprises.  I also find that monitoring by the SEC 
decreases the probability of firms’ mixing restatement and earnings news.  On 
average, firms delay announcements of income-decreasing restatements longer than 
 vii 
announcements of income-increasing restatements, and institutional ownership is 
positively associated with more timely disclosures of restatement news.  I show that 
firms with weak corporate governance or less external monitoring are more likely to 
make news of a restatement difficult to find.  Restatements performed without a 
Form 8-K filing are much less likely to be disclosed in a company-issued press 
release or to receive attention in the business press, and I find some evidence that the 
initial market reaction to obscure restatement announcements is less negative than 
the reaction to restatements disclosed transparently.  Collectively, these results 
suggest that even in the presence of strict disclosure requirements, some firms 
attempt to strategically manage the timing and transparency of restatement 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This paper investigates whether firms strategically disclose accounting 
restatements by coordinating restatement announcements with earnings releases, 
delaying the announcement of income-decreasing restatements, or obscuring 
restatement announcements by failing to alert investors of a restatement with a 
required Form 8-K filing.  I examine whether corporate governance, external 
monitoring, and the size or direction of a restatement influence how firms publicly 
disclose a restatement.  Although the accounting literature has explored the causes 
and consequences of restatements (Efendi et al. 2007, Burns and Kedia 2006, Desai 
et al. 2006, Palmrose et al. 2004, Gleason et al. 2004, Srinivasan 2005), the literature 
has not investigated whether firms strategically manage the timeliness and 
transparency of restatement disclosures.  This paper also addresses the impact of a 
new restatement disclosure rule and provides insights on whether strategic disclosure 
incentives affect the degree of compliance with SEC regulation. 
Restatement disclosure choices have important implications for capital 
market participants because delaying the public disclosure of a restatement slows the 
market’s ability to impound restatement information into the value of a company’s 
securities.  Additionally, obscure restatement announcements are difficult for 
outsiders to monitor.  Restatements often result in significant stock price declines or 
management turnover, and restatement volume has increased considerably in recent 
years (Palmrose et al. 2004, Desai et al. 2006, and Glass Lewis 2006). 
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The disclosure literature demonstrates that managers may strategically time 
the release of negative earnings news (Patell and Wolfson 1982, DellaVigna and 
Pollet 2005, Bagnoli et al. 2006), delay the release of bad news relative to good news 
(Hong et al. 2000, Kothari et al. 2005), and coordinate the timing of good and bad 
news disclosures (Aboody and Kasznik 2000, Lansford 2006).  Managers may 
choose to strategically delay or obscure the public disclosure of a restatement 
because of career or reputation concerns (Desai et al. 2006, Kothari et al. 2005).  
Restatements provide a unique research setting for examining how the motivation to 
strategically disclose bad news interacts with the strict regulatory requirement of a 
timely and transparent disclosure. 
My main sample consists of 823 restatements announced between the 
effective date of a new SEC rule governing restatement disclosures (August 24, 
2004) and December 31, 2005.  All restatements in my sample correct accounting 
errors in previously issued financial statements.  Using a logit model to predict the 
decision to announce a restatement on the same day as an earnings release, I find that 
small income-decreasing restatements are more likely than other restatements to be 
announced on the same day as a positive earnings surprise.  External monitoring by 
the SEC reduces the likelihood of mixing earnings and restatement news.   
I also find that firms delay announcements of income-decreasing restatements 
longer than announcements of income-increasing restatements, and institutional 
ownership is positively associated with a more prompt restatement disclosure.  
Logistic regression indicates that firms whose board chair also functions as CEO (a 
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proxy for weak corporate governance) are only one-fourth as likely as other firms to 
openly disclose a restatement on an 8-K, but monitoring by the SEC and institutional 
investors increases the likelihood of a Form 8-K filing.  I also document that 
restatements not disclosed on a Form 8-K are also much less likely to be disclosed in 
a company-issued press release or in the business press.  Finally, I find some 
evidence that the initial market reaction to obscure restatement announcements is 
less negative than the reaction to transparent announcements.   
This paper extends the prior literature on accounting restatements by 
providing empirical evidence that the size and direction of a restatement affect firms’ 
restatement disclosure strategies.  My results also add to the body of evidence in the 
literature concerning the influence of external monitoring and corporate governance 
on disclosure quality.  I show that institutional ownership and strong corporate 
governance are associated with more timely and transparent restatement disclosures.  
While it appears that many restating firms circumvented the SEC disclosure 
requirements by failing to file a Form 8-K, firms that did comply with the 8-K filing 
requirement made significantly more timely disclosures of restatements than firms 
that restated without an 8-K.  The collective evidence in this paper suggests that 
strategic disclosure incentives can affect the degree of compliance with mandatory 
reporting requirements. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the 
background and prior research.  Chapter 3 describes the sample selection and 
descriptive statistics.  The next chapters present the hypothesis development, 
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research design, and empirical results for the following topics: packaging 
restatements with earnings announcements (Chapter 4); delaying income-decreasing 
restatement announcements (Chapter 5);  and obscuring restatement disclosures 
(Chapter 6).  Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
Chapter 2: Background and Prior Research 
2.1 Background 
 
2.1.1 Prior Research on Disclosure 
Existing research on disclosure choice provides insights into how managers 
may choose to disclose accounting restatements.  While information asymmetry and 
agency conflicts between managers and outside investors drive the demand for 
external financial reporting, they also provide the opportunity for managers to 
withhold and strategically disclose bad news (see Healy and Palepu 2001, and Fields 
et al. 2001).  Managers face a tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of making 
disclosures that reveal their superior knowledge about firm prospects.  Kothari et al. 
(2005) document patterns of stock-price reactions to good and bad news that are 
consistent with the idea that managers steadily release good news but withhold bad 
news until they reach a “bad news threshold” after which it becomes too costly to 
delay bad news further.  The authors suggest that the asymmetric payoff to managers 
for disclosing good vs. bad news may motivate the systematic delaying of bad news 
releases.  While good news may help ensure continued employment or wealth 
increases, bad news can lead to abrupt consequences such as termination, even if the 
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manager is not directly responsible for the problem disclosed.  Kothari et al. (2005) 
conclude that managers may attempt to use disclosures as a means of offsetting 
conservative accounting standards that accelerate the recognition of bad news. 
Several additional papers in the academic literature provide potential 
motivations for managers’ attempts to bury restatement news in financial statement 
footnotes.  The “incomplete revelation hypothesis” (IRH) in Bloomfield (2002) 
predicts that managers will attempt to temporarily boost or maintain stock prices by 
disclosing bad news in financial statement footnotes because information in the 
footnotes may be more difficult for some investors to extract.  Experimental 
evidence in the accounting literature has demonstrated that information’s prominence 
or placement in the financial statements can influence the cost of extracting the 
information or affect the weight investors place on the information (e.g., Hirst and 
Hopkins 1998 and Maines and McDaniel 2000).   
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) provide a theoretical framework that describes 
the financial-reporting implications of the “limited attention” of investors.  Since 
time and attention are costly, the prominence with which information is presented in 
the financial statements may affect investors’ interpretations and perceptions of the 
information—even for otherwise identical disclosures.  Hirshleifer and Teoh explain 
that the salience of accounting information may also affect users’ judgments about 
causality or the importance of the information, and they give the example of a 
footnote disclosure as one that some investors may fail to process because of a lack 
of salience.  Collectively, the evidence in these papers supports the idea that 
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managers may attempt to temporarily delay or limit the negative reaction to an 
accounting restatement by burying restatement disclosures in financial statement 
footnotes. 
2.1.2 Restatement Disclosure Practices 
In practice, firms’ choices concerning how and when to publicly disclose 
restatements have varied widely for many years, but this fact has received only 
cursory attention in the academic literature.  Palmrose et al. (2004) note that 
restatements may be disclosed in a press release, on a Form 8-K filing with the SEC, 
or by the filing of amended financial statements.  Past regulatory indifference to the 
disparity in disclosure practices is surprising because accounting restatement 
announcements often result in a significant market reaction.  More recently, a 
number of high-profile accounting scandals and an increasing volume of 
restatements have resulted in new regulation governing accounting restatement 
disclosures.1 
Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Real Time Issuer 
Disclosures”) requires that public companies disclose “on a rapid and current basis… 
information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of 
the issuer.”  The SEC implemented this requirement in the Final Rule on Additional 
8-K Disclosure Requirements (effective August 2004).  This rule created a new 8-K 
filing specifically for disclosing restatements that correct errors in previously issued 
                                                 
1 Glass Lewis & Co (2006, 2007) estimates that average restatement volume in the U.S. between 1997 
and 2002 was 220 restatements per year.  In 2004, they count 627 restatements, in 2005 they count 
1,255 restatements, and in 2006 restatement volume rose to 1,420. 
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financial statements and shortened the 8-K filing deadline for restatements to within 
four business days of determining the need to restate.  The rule requires firms to alert 
investors of a forthcoming restatement on an 8-K even if the precise impact of the 
restatement has not yet been determined.  The SEC explained that the new rule 
would “benefit markets” by providing investors with “better and more timely 
disclosure of important corporate events.”2 
While the SEC’s Final Rule on 8-K Disclosures was intended to bring news 
of accounting errors to the market in a more timely and transparent way, the 
regulation has not been entirely effective.  Between August 24, 2004, and the end of 
2005, more than one-third of restatements by public companies to correct errors in 
the primary financial statements were performed with no accompanying Item 4.02 
Form 8-K filing.3  Beyond noncompliance with SEC regulation, failure to announce 
a restatement on an 8-K report is important to investors because most companies that 
restate without an 8-K report also do not issue a press release or amend the misstated 
financial statements and the restatement was much less likely to be mentioned in the 
press.  Consequently, outsiders often have no opportunity to learn about obscure 
                                                 
2 SEC “Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date” 
(2004). 
3 See Glass, Lewis & Co report “Getting It Wrong the First Time,” March 2006.  Some managers 
have attempted to explain the failure to file a 4.02 8-K by advocating that some restatements were 
“immaterial”; however, only material errors require a restatement in the first place.  Furthermore, the 
SEC’s Final Rule on Additional 8-K Disclosures holds that restatements are “unquestionably or 
presumptively material.” (SEC 2004) 
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restatement disclosures unless they find the disclosure in the footnotes of a regularly 
scheduled 10-Q or 10-K filing.4 
2.1.3 Prior Research on Accounting Restatements 
 
 A substantial number of papers in the academic literature have investigated 
the ex ante characteristics of firms that ultimately restate their financial statements.  
Efendi et al. (2007) investigate the factors that led to a large number of accounting 
restatements following the stock market bubble of the late 1990s.  They find that the 
probability of a misstatement increases dramatically when the CEO holds a large 
number of “in-the-money” options, and the likelihood of a more severe misstatement 
also increases with larger amounts of in-the-money options.  They also find that 
CEOs who simultaneously serve as chair of the board of directors (“CEO duality”) 
are more likely to misstate financial statements.  These results are consistent with 
CEO duality impairing the oversight role of the board of directors and with Jensen’s 
(2005) argument that some managers of firms with overvalued equity will take 
actions—including misstating earnings—to support their stock price. 
 Burns and Kedia (2006) examine managers’ motivations for misstating and 
find evidence that CEOs whose option portfolios are most sensitive to stock price 
have the highest probability of misstating earnings.  They document that option 
sensitivity is positively related to aggressive accounting practices that lead to 
restatements.  Abbott et al. (2004) investigate 88 annual restatements during the 
                                                 
4 Glass, Lewis & Co. reported that 14 percent of restatements in 2005 were disclosed only in the 
footnotes of regular SEC filings, and Audit Analytics reports that 32 percent of restatements in the 
first half of 2006 were similarly obscurely disclosed (Audit Analytics 2006). 
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1990s and find that the independence and activity level of the audit committee are 
significantly negatively related to the occurrence of a restatement.  They also find 
that firms with audit committees that include at least one member with financial 
expertise are less likely to restate.  These results support the idea that the audit 
committee plays an important role in monitoring the financial reporting process.   
Myers et al. (2005) investigate the relation between the length of the auditor-
client relationship and the likelihood of an accounting restatement, but do not find 
significant evidence of an association.  However, they do find that, among firms 
restating quarterly financial statements, longer auditor-client relationships are 
associated with a higher likelihood of income-increasing and core-earnings 
misstatements.  Baber et al. (2005) is an example of a paper that fails to find any 
association between the probability of a restatement and a large group of corporate 
governance measures.  Among several conclusions they draw from their results, the 
authors suggest that common empirical measures of corporate governance may fail 
to capture the dimensions of corporate governance that translate most directly into 
effective governance and monitoring. 
 Another body of papers in the academic literature has investigated the 
consequences of accounting restatements.  Palmrose et al. (2004) examine the 
determinants of the market reaction to accounting restatement announcements during 
the period 1995-1999.  They document mean abnormal stock market returns of 
negative 9 percent on restatement announcement dates.  Restatements initiated by the 
external auditor and restatements involving fraud result in significantly more 
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negative returns.  They also find that restatement announcements that fail to quantify 
the impact of the restatement are associated with a more negative market reaction.  
Finally, they document non-negative CARs for 29 percent of the restatement 
announcements in their sample and propose that one explanation for a non-negative 
market response is that firms may choose to coordinate restatement announcements 
with an earnings release in order to attenuate or subsume the impact of the 
restatement.   
Gleason et al. (2004) document significant stock price declines among non-
restating firms in the same industries as restating firms.  Their evidence is strongest 
for non-restating firms with low-quality accounting, as measured by industry-
adjusted accruals.  They interpret this evidence as consistent with restatements 
causing an industry-wide increase in information risk.  They also suggest that 
accounting restatements cause investors to reexamine the credibility of previously 
issued financial data from related non-restating firms.  Hirschey et al. (2005) 
examine the long-term effects of restatements on the market value of restating firms 
and fail to find significant evidence of post-restatement announcement drift in their 
full sample.  However, they do find significant negative drift for restatements 
involving fraud or decreases in core earnings, and the initial market underreaction is 
strongest for large firms with the highest pre-restatement profitability.   
 Srinivasan (2005) documents significant labor market penalties for directors 
of firms that restate previously overstated earnings.  Audit committee members bear 
the most significant reputational costs for restatements.  During the three years 
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following a restatement, he finds that director turnover for firms that had overstated 
income before a restatement is 48 percent, compared to 33 percent for a 
performance-matched sample and 28 percent for a sample of firms that had 
understated income prior to a restatement.  Among firms that overstate earnings, he 
finds that the likelihood of director departure increases with the severity of the 
restatement.   
Desai et al. (2006) investigate management turnover following restatement 
announcements and find significant penalties for managers of restating firms.  
Within two years of announcing a restatement, approximately 60 percent of the firms 
in their sample experience turnover in at least one senior management position.  In a 
control sample, the turnover rate is just 35 percent.  Furthermore, Desai et al. (2006) 
document that rehire rates for managers of restating firms are just half that of 
managers from their control sample.   
Following up on the Desai et al. (2006) study, Hennes et al. (2007) examine 
the importance of management intent in determining whether restatements result in 
executive turnover.  They predict and find that intentional violations of GAAP are 
much more likely to result in management turnover than unintentional 
misstatements.  Most of the turnover in their sample occurs between six months 
before and six months after the restatement announcement.  Their findings suggest 
that boards act quickly to dismiss managers who intentionally mislead investors. 
Kravet and Shevlin (2006) investigate the association between restatement 
announcements and changes in the pricing of a firm-specific information risk factor.  
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They use accruals quality as a proxy for information risk and show that, relative to 
the three years prior to a restatement announcement, the market prices information 
risk more highly during the three years after a restatement.  Additionally, they find 
restatements initiated by auditors result in a larger increase in the pricing of 
information risk than restatements initiated by management, and they find that firms 
that restate more than once also experience a greater increase in the pricing of 
information risk.  Finally, they provide evidence consistent with Gleason et al. 
(2004) that the pricing of information risk increases for non-restating firms in the 
same industries as restating firms. 
 Finally, several papers have examined the ability of sophisticated investors to 
anticipate accounting irregularities and adjust their holdings in restatement firms 
prior to public announcements of earnings restatements.  Efendi et al. (2005) provide 
evidence on the ability of short sellers to identify accounting irregularities prior to 
restatement announcements.  In their study, the level of short interest in restating 
firms increases approximately 18 months prior to the public restatement 
announcement and is highest in the six months prior to the announcement.  Short 
interest peaks in the month of the restatement announcement.  Additionally, 
consistent with evidence concerning the contagion effect of restatements in Gleason 
et al. (2004), Efendi et al. (2005) find that short interest in control firms that are 
industry- and size-matched with restating firms also increases following a 
restatement announcement.   
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Hribar et al. (2004) find that transient institutional investors begin to reduce 
their holdings in restating firms one calendar quarter prior to a restatement 
announcement.  They conclude that the sophistication of institutional investors 
enables them to detect potential accounting problems and sell off shares of restating 
companies prior to public announcement of a restatement, but they cannot entirely 
rule out the possibility that their results may be partially attributable to institutional 
investors’ access to private information from management prior to Reg-FD.   
Li and Zhang (2006) show that insiders trade to their advantage around 
accounting restatement announcements.  They find that beginning in quarter t-8 prior 
to the restatement announcement, insiders begin selling their shares in restating firms 
and their selling is related to the severity of the restatement.  Consistent with 
insiders’ attempts to minimize the probability of allegations of insider trading from 
regulators, trading in the month immediately before and immediately after a 
restatement announcement is not related to restatement announcement abnormal 
returns. 
 
Chapter 3: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
 My sample of restatement observations comes from an extensive database of 
accounting restatements created and maintained by Glass, Lewis & Co, LLC, which I 
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supplement with data I hand collect from SEC filings.5  The database includes only 
restatements filed to correct accounting errors and excludes restatements for changes 
in accounting principle, GAAP-to-GAAP changes, changes in estimates, or minor 
changes in wording or typographical errors.  If a company used multiple filings to 
correct the same underlying error, the database classifies it as a single restatement 
observation. 
 Between the effective date of the Final Rule on 8-K disclosures (August 24, 
2004) and December 31, 2005, Glass Lewis identified 1,512 restatements filed by 
public companies in the U.S.  Many of the 1,512 restatements come from very small 
companies, with 386 (26 percent) of the restatements filed by firms with $10 million 
or less in total assets.  Of the 1,512 restatements, 591 (39 percent) were performed 
without an Item 4.02 Form 8-K filing.  When I combine the Glass Lewis restatement 
sample with the financial statement data from the Compustat database needed for my 
empirical tests, the restatement sample is reduced to 823 restatement observations, 
204 (25 percent) of which were never disclosed on a Form 8-K filing.   
For the entire sample of 823 restatement observations, I hand collect detailed 
information from SEC filings about the direction and cumulative impact of the 
restatement on retained earnings.  I also perform a comprehensive search of the press 
release wires, business wires, and business press to determine which restatements are 
disclosed outside of SEC filings.  I obtain institutional ownership data from 
                                                 
5 During 2005 alone, research analysts at Glass Lewis reviewed nearly 25,000 company filings to 
track restatement activity (Glass Lewis 2006).   
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Thomson Financial, corporate governance data from Board Analyst, and 
compensation data from ExecuComp.6 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 1 shows the distribution of the full sample of 823 restatement 
observations by calendar quarter of the restatement announcement, industry 
affiliation, restatement category, and stock exchange.  Panel A shows that, with the 
exception of an unusually small number of observations in the third quarter of 2004, 
the restatement announcement dates are relatively evenly distributed throughout the 
sample period.  Since my sample period begins with the effective date of the Final 
Rule on 8-K Disclosures in the middle of the third quarter of 2004, restatement 
observations are smallest for that calendar quarter.   
The large increase in restatement volume in the first quarter of 2005 
corresponds with a February 2005 letter from the SEC’s Chief Accountant, Donald 
Nicolaisen, that explained the SEC staff’s view that many firms had incorrectly 
applied existing lease accounting rules.  In response to the letter, many companies 
filed restatements in early 2005 to correct errors in lease accounting.  Panel A also 
reveals that the percentage of restatements announced on Form 8-K filings peaked in 
the first full calendar quarter after the effective date of the SEC’s rule on restatement 
disclosures.  Thus restatements disclosed without 8-K filings during my sample 
                                                 
6 Glass-Lewis did not collect information on the sign or magnitude of the restatement in terms of its 
impact on retained earnings.  See the Appendix for a list of data items taken from Glass-Lewis, 
Thomson Financial, Compustat, ExecuComp, Board Analyst, and data hand collected from SEC 
filings. 
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period do not appear related to a “learning curve” firms experienced before 
becoming familiar with the new rule. 
Panel B breaks the sample into industry categories based on the major 
divisions of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  Professional services 
firms make up the smallest proportion of the restatement sample (4%), and industrial 
manufacturing firms represent the largest industry group in the sample (23%).7  In 
Panel C, the restatement observations are classified according to the primary error 
corrected by the restatement.8  Expense recognition, misclassification, and revenue 
recognition make up the three largest categories of errors in my restatement sample, 
representing 31 percent, 16 percent, and 12 percent of the observations, 
respectively.9  Finally, Panel D reveals that nearly 90 percent of the restating firms in 
my sample are listed on either the NASDAQ exchange or the NYSE, and the 
remaining observations are AMEX or OTC firms. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest in 
my full sample.  As shown in Panel A, the average restatement in my sample reduced 
retained earnings by 10 percent (median 1 percent reduction).  More than 25 percent 
of the restatements in my sample reduced retained earnings by at least 5 percent, and 
another 25 percent of the observations had a non-negative impact on retained 
earnings.  The mean number of misstated periods corrected by the restatements in 
                                                 
7 To ensure that industry-related effects do not explain restatement disclosure strategy, I use industry-
level fixed effects in all regression models, and I cluster standard errors by industry. 
8 Many restatements involve the correction of errors in more than one category.  The variable 
PERVASIVE used later in the regression models corresponds to how many categories the restated 
errors affected.  The categorization of errors is defined by Glass Lewis & Co. 
9 The expense recognition category includes errors related to accounting for leases. 
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my sample (NUM_YRS) is 2.1 years (median 2.0), and the average number of days 
between the end of the final period misstated and the initial public disclosure of the 
restatement (HORIZON) is 245 days (median 164 days).   
Average total assets (ASSETS) for the firms in my sample is $3.8 billion 
(median $431 million), and average market value of equity (MVE) is $2.0 billion 
(median $345 million).  The average restatement involves errors in between one and 
two (1.6) categories of accounting misstatements (PERVASIVE), the average 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) of restating firms is 2.76, average financial leverage 
(LEV) is 0.24, the mean earnings variability measure (EARN_VAR) is 108, and 
mean ROA is -0.03 (median 0.01).   
Tables 3 divides the sample of 823 restatements into those that had a negative 
impact on retained earnings (516) and those that had a non-negative impact on 
retained earnings (307).  Panel A reveals that misstatements that overstate income 
are likely to persist for longer periods of time than restatements that understate 
income (mean 2.21 years compare to 1.80 years).  Negative restatements also have a 
significantly higher mean PERVASIVE score, which represents the number of 
misstatement categories included in the restatement. 
Table 3 Panel B indicates that income-decreasing restatements are more 
likely to be performed without amending previously issued financial statements and 
are more likely to be annual restatements instead of restatements of interim or 
quarterly periods.  Income-decreasing restatements are also more likely to 
correspond with an internal controls weakness disclosure and be related to lease 
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accounting.  Table 4 presents the simple correlations between variables in my 
sample.  These correlations are generally in the predicted direction, and no two 
independent variables are highly correlated enough to cause concern about 
multicollinearity in regression models. 
In summary, evidence from the descriptive statistics suggests that the 
restatements in my sample were a result of accounting errors in many different areas 
of the financial statements and these errors occurred in firms across many different 
industries.  Most accounting errors resulted in an initial overstatement of income, 
corrected during my sample period with an income-decreasing restatement.  Errors 
that overstated income persisted for longer periods of time than errors that 
understated income.  The next chapters present my hypotheses, research design, and 
empirical results. 
 
Chapter 4: Packaging Restatement Announcements with 
Earnings News 
 
4.1 Development of Hypotheses 
 
Managers may be able to affect the market reaction to news of an income-
decreasing restatement by strategically “mixing” news of the restatement with 
earnings news.  Lansford (2006) provides empirical evidence that managers 
strategically coordinate the timing of good and bad news disclosures.  He finds that 
the probability of disclosing good news related to patents in the period immediately 
before a negative earnings announcement increases in the magnitude of the negative 
earnings surprise.  Additionally, more than one-third of the CFOs surveyed by 
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Graham et al. (2005) agreed with the idea of strategically mixing or “packaging” bad 
news with other disclosures.   
Mixing news of an income-decreasing restatement with a positive earnings 
surprise may help “offset” the negative market reaction to the restatement.  
Alternatively, firms may opt for a “big bath” by mixing restatement news with a 
negative earnings surprise.10  Collectively, these findings lead to my first hypothesis: 
H1a: Income-decreasing restatements are more likely than neutral or 
income-increasing restatements to be disclosed on the same day as an 
earnings announcement. 
External monitoring and strong corporate governance may discourage firms 
from attempting to mitigate the consequences of a restatement by packaging 
restatement news with earnings news.  For example, when an SEC investigation 
precedes a restatement, a firm may be less likely to publicly announce the 
restatement on the same day as an earnings announcement because the SEC could 
conclude that the firm has not complied with the four-day rapid disclosure rule when 
the initial public announcement occurs on the same day as an earnings 
announcement.  Likewise, an independent audit committee and board chair may be 
more likely to insist on a rapid, transparent disclosure of a restatement, making it 
difficult to coordinate the announcement with an earnings release. 
Additionally, firms who have recently changed external auditors 
(AUDIT_SWITCH) may be subject to additional monitoring both by the new audit 
                                                 
10 Results consistent with “big bath” reporting behavior have been documented, for example, in the 
case of asset impairments (Riedl 2004, Zucca and Campbell 1992).   
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firm and by stakeholders or regulators who perceive the auditor switch as a signal of 
potential accounting problems.  Finally, firms with high institutional ownership 
(INST_OWNERSHIP) are monitored more closely by sophisticated investors, which 
may reduce the likelihood that firms attempt to attenuate the reaction to a restatement 
announcement by packaging the announcement with an earnings release.  These 
associations lead to my next hypothesis: 
H1b: External monitoring and strong corporate governance decrease the 
likelihood that firms disclose a restatement on the same day as an 
earnings announcement. 
4.2 Research Design 
 
 I use logistic regression and a multinomial logit model to test Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b concerning the choice to disclose news of a restatement on the same day as an 
earnings announcement.  Equation 1 shows the form of the regression model. 
 
EARN_ANNC j,t  = β0 + β1 LARGE_NEG j,t + β2 SMALL_NEG j,t + β3 SMALL_POS j,t + 
β4 LARGE_POS j,t + β5 NUM_YRS j,t + β6 IC_WEAK j,t +  
Β7 PERVASIVE j,t + β8 SEC j,t + β9 AUDIT_SWITCH j,t +  
β10 INST_OWNERSHIP j,t + β11 CEO_CHAIR j,t + β12 AUD_INDEP j,t +  
β13 LEV j,t + β14 ROA j,t + β15 M/B j,t + β16 EARN_VAR j,t + β17 LOGTA j,t 
+ ε j,t 
 
 The dependent variable, EARN_ANNC, is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the firm announced the restatement on the same day as an earnings announcement, 
(1) 
 21 
and 0 otherwise.11  I place all restatements into one of five buckets: LARGE_NEG, 
SMALL_NEG, ZERO_IMPACT, SMALL_POS, and LARGE_POS.  
ZERO_IMPACT are those restatements that had no impact on retained earnings; 
LARGE_NEG and LARGE_POS are the top and bottom 10 percent of the 
distribution of restatement impacts on retained earnings; and SMALL_NEG and 
SMALL_POS are restatements that had a negative or positive impact on retained 
earnings that was smaller in magnitude than the restatements in the LARGE_NEG 
and LARGE_POS buckets, respectively.12   
Since the market reaction to income-decreasing restatements is likely to be 
more negative than the reaction to zero-impact or income-increasing restatements 
(Palmrose et al. 2004), managers’ attempts to strategically package earnings news 
with restatement announcements should be focused on announcements of income-
decreasing restatements.  Consequently, I anticipate a significantly positive 
coefficient on LARGE_NEG and SMALL_NEG, ceteris paribus.   
I also assess the impact of restatement severity (NUM_YRS, IC_WEAK, 
PERVASIVE), monitoring (SEC, AUDIT_SWITCH, INST_OWNERSHIP), and 
governance (CEO_CHAIR, AUD_INDEP) on the decision to mix restatement news 
and earnings news.  NUM_YRS is the number of reporting periods (in years) that 
                                                 
11 About 26 percent of the 823 restatement observations in my sample were announced on the same 
day as an earnings announcement. 
12 The distribution of restatement impacts on retained earnings is left skewed.  The mean and median 
impacts are negative, and the third quartile (75th percentile) is zero impact.  Results are generally 
similar using the top and bottom 15% of restatements for the cutoffs for LARGE_NEG and 
LARGE_POS; however when I use the top and bottom 15% of restatement impacts as the cutoff, 
there are very few restatements in the SMALL_POS bucket.  So I chose the top and bottom 10% of 
restatements as the cutoffs for LARGE_NEG and LARGE_POS. 
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were misstated; PERVASIVE is the number of financial-statement categories that 
were misstated; and IC_WEAK is an indicator variable that represents whether the 
firm disclosed a material weakness in internal controls in connection with the 
restatement.  Because the impact of severe restatements on stock price should be 
more severe, firms might be more likely to attempt to package severe restatements 
with earnings news.  However, if firms are trying to “dilute” the negative market 
reaction to a restatement announcement by mixing the announcement with earnings 
news, they may anticipate that earnings news will only effectively dilute the impact 
of a less severe restatement.  Consequently, I do not make specific predictions for the 
three restatement severity proxies. 
For external monitoring, SEC is an indicator variable signifying the direct 
involvement of the SEC in the restatement; AUDIT_SWITCH is an indicator 
variable that represents whether the firm changed external auditors in the year prior 
to the restatement announcement; and INST_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the 
firm’s stock that is held by institutional investors. I expect external monitoring by the 
SEC (SEC), a new external auditor (AUDIT_SWITCH), or institutional investors 
(INST_OWNERSHIP) to decrease the likelihood of packaging restatement news 
with earnings news because managers may be wary of attempting to strategically 
package a restatement disclosure when external monitors are scrutinizing managerial 
behavior.  Managers may perceive that external monitoring could cause the potential 
costs of strategic reporting to outweigh the benefits. 
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Two variables represent corporate governance: CEO_CHAIR is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the chair of the board of directors is also the CEO 
of the firm, and AUD_INDEP represents the proportion of the audit committee that 
is comprised of directors who are outsiders.  Since CEO duality is associated with 
greater agency problems (Efendi et al. 2007 and Core et al. 1999), I expect 
CEO_CHAIR to be positively related to the probability of mixing restatement news 
with earnings news.  AUD_INDEP should be negatively related to decision to mix 
restatement and earnings news because a more independent audit committee will 
more effectively monitor firm reporting (Ajinkya et al. 2005, Karamanou and 
Vaefeas 2005).   
In Equation 1 and all other models in the paper, my control variables consist 
of: financial leverage (LEV), operating performance (ROA), growth expectations 
(M/B), earnings variability (EARN_VAR), and firm size (LOGTA).  These variables 
have been used as control variables in other research investigating strategic 
disclosure (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt 2004) because each variable may influence 
firm disclosure behavior.  For example, the possibility of violating debt covenants 
may influence highly levered firms’ disclosure behavior; and a desire to sustain 
recent firm performance, growth expectations, or earnings smoothness could 
motivate managers’ choices about how they disclose a restatement.  Similarly, the 
reporting environment at large firms is likely to differ from the environment at small 
firms in ways that might influence disclosure choices.  Consequently, I include these 
control variables in each regression model. 
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4.3 Results for Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
 
Table 5 Panels A, B, and C present the results of logistic regression models 
that predict the choice to announce an accounting restatement on the same day as an 
earnings announcement.  The results are generally consistent with Hypothesis 1a, but 
support for Hypothesis 1b is less convincing.  In Panels A, B, and C small income-
decreasing restatements (SMALL_NEG) are significantly more likely than zero-
impact restatements to be packaged with earnings news.  Large, income-decreasing 
restatements, however, are not significantly more likely than zero-impact 
restatements to be disclosed on the same day as an earnings announcement.  This 
result may indicate that firms believe there is less likelihood that packaging a 
restatement announcement with an earnings announcement will benefit the firm if 
the restatement is very large.  Firms may also believe that large restatements will 
attract more attention from investors and the SEC, leading firms to avoid attempting 
to mix earnings news with news of large restatements.   
The odds ratios for SMALL_NEG (1.59, 2.07, and 2.38) indicate that small, 
negative restatements are more than one-and-a-half times more likely than zero-
impact restatements to be mixed with earnings announcements.  This evidence is 
consistent with managers’ believing they can either reduce the adverse impact of a 
negative restatement on their stock price by mixing restatement news with a positive 
earnings surprise or they believe they can take a “big bath” by mixing restatement 
news with a negative earnings surprise. 
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The results in Table 5 Panels A and B also confirm that SEC involvement in 
a restatement significantly reduces the likelihood that a firm will announce a 
restatement on the same day as an earnings release.  The negative coefficients on 
SEC lend support to the assertion that packaging restatement news with earnings 
news is a strategic reporting choice because they indicate that regulator involvement 
decreases the likelihood of this disclosure behavior.  The odds ratios for SEC in 
Panels A and B (0.40 and 0.34) suggest that firms are less than half as likely to mix 
restatement and earnings news when the SEC is involved in the restatement.  The 
other monitoring and governance variables (AUDIT_SWITCH, 
INST_OWNERSHIP, CEO_CHAIR, and AUD_INDEP) fail to load significantly in 
any of the models in Panels A, B, or C.  A recent switch in external auditor, 
institutional ownership, CEO duality, and the independence of the audit committee 
do not appear to significantly influence the decision to mix a restatement 
announcement with earnings news. 
In Table 5 Panel D, I analyze whether the sign of the earnings surprise 
influences the decision to package earnings news with restatement news.  Using a 
multinomial logit model, I divide earnings news into three categories: negative, zero, 
and positive earnings surprises.13  Restatements that are announced on days with no 
earnings news provide the base case for comparing the coefficients.  The results of 
this multinomial logit model indicate that the packaging of restatement news with 
                                                 
13 I proxy for expected earnings using the last consensus (median) analyst forecast of earnings prior to 
the earnings announcement in the IBES database.  
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earnings news occurs primarily when firms mix a small income-decreasing 
restatement with a positive earnings surprise.   
This combination is consistent with managers attempting to “offset” the 
negative market reaction to the restatement announcement with a positive market 
reaction to a positive earnings surprise.  Compared with a zero-impact restatement, 
small negative restatements (SMALL_NEG) are 2.73 times more likely to be 
disclosed on the same day as a positive earnings surprise than disclosed on a day 
with no earnings announcement.14  None of the other restatement categories (i.e., 
LARGE_NEG, SMALL_POS, LARGE_POS) is significantly more likely than zero-
impact restatements to be disclosed on the same day as a positive earnings surprise.  
I believe this result provides some of the strongest evidence in this paper that 
managers attempt to strategically disclose accounting restatements.   
 
Chapter 5: Strategically Delaying Restatement 
Announcements 
 
5.1 Development of Hypotheses 
 
Conventional wisdom and evidence from the management earnings forecast 
literature suggests that managers will be motivated to promptly disclose bad news in 
some settings for at least two reasons: litigation risk may increase if investors 
perceive a firm excessively delayed releasing bad news (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and 
                                                 
14 The relative risk ratio (i.e., RRR) in a multinomial logit model is analogous to the odds ratio in 
logistic regression.  In this case, the RRR of 2.73 equals the amount by which the predicted odds that 
the restatement is announced on a day with a positive earnings surprise (compared with restatement 
announcements on days with no earnings announcement) are multiplied when the restatement is in the 
SMALL_NEG category, other things being equal. 
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Lev 1995, and Field et al. 2005); and firms may be able to lower their cost of capital 
by reducing the information asymmetry faced by investors (e.g., Botosan 1997 and 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002).  However, after managers conclude they must restate 
previously issued financial statements, career or reputation concerns may motivate 
managers to delay public disclosure of a restatement (Desai et al. 2006, Kothari et al. 
2005).  Managers may wait for the opportunity to coordinate a restatement 
announcement with other events such as: corporate events like stock option grants 
that directly affect the wealth of the manager (e.g., Aboody and Kasznik 2000 and 
Ertimur et al. 2006), the announcement of a restatement by an industry peer (Tse and 
Tucker, 2006), or positive news to mix with the news of the restatement (Lansford 
2006). 
Evidence that firms strategically time the disclosure of firm-specific 
information such as earnings releases has also existed in the literature for many 
years.  Patell and Wolfson (1982) investigate the intraday timing of earnings and 
dividend announcements and find that managers release good news during trading 
hours but withhold bad news until after trading hours.  More recently, DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2005) show that earnings news released on Fridays is more negative than 
news released during the week and Bagnoli et al. (2006) find that a vast majority of 
earnings news is now announced outside of trading hours.   
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that firms strategically time the release of 
good news and bad news around stock option award dates in order to maximize 
stock-option compensation, and Ertimur et al. (2006) find evidence that managers 
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issue optimistically biased forecasts and tend to withhold bad news before IPO 
lockup expirations in order to maximize their personal profit upon selling IPO 
shares.  Finally, in a survey of chief financial officers, Graham et al. (2005) report 
that 66 percent of CFOs agree or strongly agree with the idea of delaying bad news 
to allow more analysis or interpretation or in hopes that the firm’s status will 
improve before the next required information announcement.   Since the stock price 
reaction to income-decreasing restatements is significantly more negative than the 
reaction to neutral or income-increasing restatements (Palmrose et al. 2004), I expect 
managers to strategically delay the disclosure of negative restatements incrementally 
longer than neutral or positive restatements: 
H2a: Firms delay public announcements of income-decreasing 
restatements longer than announcements of income-increasing 
restatements. 
Several papers in the academic literature have examined the monitoring role  
of institutional investors with respect to the firms whose stock they hold.  Bushee 
(1998) finds that managers of firms with high institutional ownership are 
significantly less likely to reduce R&D expenditures to reverse an earnings decline.  
These results are consistent with the idea that, relative to individual investors, 
institutional investors are able to monitor and discipline managers and encourage 
them to maximize long-run value over short-term gains.   
Additionally, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership 
concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive 
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compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation.  This evidence 
suggests institutional investors serve a monitoring role and help mitigate the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers.  Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms 
with greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue frequent management 
forecasts that are more accurate and specific.  They conclude that monitoring by 
institutional investors is related to the extent and quality of discretionary information 
a manager discloses to the market.   
Evidence in the accounting literature suggests that strong corporate 
governance is also associated with increased quality of disclosure.  Efendi et al. 
(2007) show that firms whose CEO also serves as chair of the board of directors are 
more likely to misstate the financial statements, and Core et al. (1999) find evidence 
of greater agency problems when the board chair is also the CEO.  Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) find that firms with more effective board and audit committee 
structures are more likely to issue and update accurate management earnings 
forecasts and conclude that effective corporate governance is associated with higher 
financial disclosure quality.  Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with 
more outside directors issue more frequent and accurate management forecasts.   
These papers all provide evidence suggesting a relation between disclosure 
quality and monitoring by either institutional investors or the board of directors.  
Agency problems and a firm’s information environment will affect both the 
timeliness and transparency of firm disclosures (Boritz and Liu 2006).  My next 
hypothesis concerns the effect of institutional ownership and board independence on 
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the timeliness of restatement disclosures, and I deal with disclosure transparency in 
the following chapter. 
H2b: Firms with high institutional ownership and more independent 
boards of directors disclose restatement news more promptly than other 
firms. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
 
I use duration analysis to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b concerning the impact of 
restatement direction, institutional ownership, and corporate governance on the 
timeliness of restatement announcements.   Duration or survival analysis has become 
an increasingly common statistical method in the economic literature for analyzing 
duration data such as CEO tenure or the length of an unemployment spell (Kiefer 
1988).  This research design is well suited for testing my hypotheses because I am 
investigating the length of time that elapses between the end of the final period 
misstatement and the initial public disclosure of the restatement.  Duration analysis 
estimates the conditional probability of an event (i.e., the restatement announcement) 
taking place at time t + δ, given that the event has not yet taken place in time t.  For 
example, the hazard model in this paper estimates the probability that a restatement 
will be announced 120 days after the end of the last period misstated, given that no 
announcement has been made by the 119th day.  The results of the model are 
analogous to an “instantaneous rate of change” in restatement announcement 
probability.   
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One commonly used method of duration analysis that examines the effects of 
multiple continuous or categorical predictors is a Cox proportional hazard model.  
The hazard rate at time t is defined as: 
 
  
I define the hazard rate as a function of the baseline hazard (h0) at time t and 
the effects of the following explanatory variables in Equation 2: 
h(t) = h0(t) exp(β1 LARGE_NEG j,t + β2 SMALL_NEG j,t +  
β3 SMALL_POS j,t + β4 LARGE_POS j,t + β5 NUM_YRS j,t +  
β6 IC_WEAK j,t + β7 PERVASIVE j,t + β8 LEASES j,t + β9 OBSCURE_1 j,t + 
β10 OBSCURE_2  j,t + β11 SEC j,t + β12 INST_OWNERSHIP j,t +  
β13 CEO_CHAIR j,t + β14 AUD_INDEP j,t + β15 LEV j,t + β16 ROA j,t +  
β17 M/B j,t + β18 EARN_VAR j,t + β19 LOGTA j,t).  
 
The Cox regression method uses nonparametric estimation to obtain 
maximum likelihood estimates of the β parameters in the model.  An advantage of 
this method is its insensitivity to the specification of a functional form for the 
baseline hazard.15  The βs in Equation 2 represent the regression coefficients that are 
commonly exponentiated to create hazard ratios with a more intuitive interpretation.  
A negative sign on the coefficient estimate indicates a lower hazard rate, and a 
positive sign indicates a higher hazard rate.  The hazard ratios created from the 
coefficient estimates indicate the incremental change in the hazard rate relative to a 
baseline hazard rate.  The hazard model in Equation 2 is derived from the HORIZON 
                                                 
15 Specification tests are necessary to assure the appropriateness of a proportional hazards model.  
“Log-log” plots and Kaplan-Meier plots suggest a proportional hazards model is appropriate for this 












variable, which measures the number of days that elapse between the end of the final 
period misstated and the date firm initially publicly discloses the restatement.16 
One of the primary objectives of the SEC’s new rule on 8-K disclosures is to 
require firms to publicly alert investors of a pending restatement more rapidly than in 
the past.  Because managers expect a negative market reaction to income-decreasing 
restatements, I predict that negative restatements (LARGE_NEG and SMALL_NEG) 
will have longer restatement horizons than the other restatement categories.  In 
addition, if obscure restatement disclosures are less timely than transparent 
restatement disclosures, then the coefficients on OBSCURE_1 and OBSCURE_2 
will also be negative.  OBSCURE_1 represents restatements that were disclosed only 
in the footnotes of regularly scheduled financial statements (i.e., the most obscure 
way to disclose a restatement in SEC filings).  OBSCURE_2 represents restatements 
disclosed with amended financial statements but without an 8-K filing (i.e., the 
second most obscure way to disclose a restatement in SEC filings). 
I expect the monitoring variables SEC and INST_OWNERSHIP to be 
positively related to the hazard rate because outside monitoring should lead 
managers to disclose restatements more promptly.  I also expect AUD_INDEP to be 
positively related to the hazard rate since a more independent audit committee should 
result in more timely disclosure practices in accordance with the prompt disclosure 
requirements of the SEC rule.  CEO_CHAIR should be negatively related to the 
                                                 
16 The initial public disclosure of the restatement may take the form of a press release, an 8-K filing, 
an amended 10-K or 10-Q filing, or a note in a regularly scheduled 10-K or 10-Q filing. 
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hazard rate because CEO duality has been shown to negatively impact the 
monitoring role of the board of directors (Efendi et al. 2007, Core et al. 1999). 
5.3 Results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
 
Table 6 Panels A and B present the results of estimating two Cox 
proportional hazard models to assess the effect of the sign of the restatement and 
external monitoring and governance on the timeliness of restatement announcements.  
The results are mixed with respect to my predictions in Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  In 
Panel A, which uses all 823 restatement observations, the results reveal that 
disclosure transparency is significantly related to the restatement horizon: the least 
transparent restatement announcements (OBSCURE_1 and OBSCURE_2) are 
delayed longer than the more transparent restatement announcements.  The hazard 
ratios of 0.35 for OBSCURE_1 and 0.51 for OBSCURE_2 indicate that, conditional 
on not having been announced at time t, obscure restatement announcements are only 
35 or 51 percent as likely as the most transparent announcements to be disclosed at 
time t + δ.  However, neither the sign of the restatement nor the monitoring variable 
(SEC) is significantly related to restatement announcement timeliness. 
The results of the second Cox proportional hazard model in Panel B are more 
consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  Because of data restrictions, this model uses 
249 restatement observations.17  In this model, announcements of the largest income-
decreasing restatements (LARGE_NEG) are delayed the longest of all restatements 
as indicated by the hazard ratio of 0.42.  Announcements of smaller income-
                                                 
17 The smaller sample of restatements is more heavily weighted toward large, stable companies 
because the Board  Analyst database is comprised primarily of larger companies.   
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decreasing restatements (SMALL_NEG) are also significantly delayed relative to 
zero-impact restatements (hazard ratio of 0.64).  The 0.42 hazard ratio on 
LARGE_NEG means that conditional on not having been disclosed by time t, a large 
negative restatement is only 42 percent as likely as a zero-impact restatement to be 
disclosed at time t + δ.  These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2a that 
managers will strategically delay the announcement of income-decreasing 
restatements.   
The model in Panel B also reveals that institutional ownership is positively 
related to more timely announcements of restatements (hazard ratio of 1.46), but the 
governance variables are not significantly related to the restatement horizon.  Once 
again, the most obscure restatement disclosures (OBSCURE_1 and OBSCURE_2) 
are also the least timely in this model, with hazard ratios of 0.34 and 0.46 
respectively.  One of the purposes of the SEC’s Final Rule on Form 8-K Disclosures 
was to uniformly improve the timeliness of restatement announcements, but these 
results suggest that the magnitude and direction of the restatement together with 
monitoring by institutional investors all influence the timeliness of restatement 
announcements.  Since firms delay announcements of income-decreasing 
restatements longer than announcements of other restatements, this behavior is 
consistent with strategic reporting of accounting restatements. 
In Table 6 Panels C and D, I rerun the same hazard models from Panels A 
and B, this time using a Weibull distribution for the hazard function as a robustness 
check on the results from Panels A and B.  The Weibull distribution is commonly 
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used in hazard functions that analyze economic events (Kiefer 1988).  Unlike the 
Cox proportional hazard model, this parametric method of duration analysis specifies 
the functional form of the hazard function (i.e., the Weibull distribution).  The results 
in Panels C and D are qualitatively very similar to the results in Panels A and B.  As 
with the Cox proportional hazard model, the Weibull model reveals that firms delay 
the disclosure of income-decreasing restatements (LARGE_NEG and 
SMALL_NEG) longer than disclosures of income-increasing or zero-impact 
restatements. 
The Weibull model also demonstrates that announcements of obscure 
restatements (OBSCURE_1 and OBSCURE_2) are delayed longer than 
announcements of transparent restatements.  The primary difference is that the 
results of the Cox model showed that institutional ownership was positively related 
to a more timely restatement disclosure, but INST_OWNERSHIP is not statistically 
significant in the hazard model that uses the Weibull distribution.  Since the results 
of the Weibull model are misspecified unless survival times actually follow a 
Weibull distribution, the results of the Cox proportional hazard model are more 
useful in this case. 
 
Chapter 6: Transparency of Restatement Disclosures 
6.1 Development of Hypotheses 
 
If sophisticated investors are more likely to monitor financial statement 
footnotes or if they are more likely to use valuation models to process the economic 
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implications of a restatement irrespective of the form of the disclosure, then 
managers of firms monitored by institutional investors should be less likely to 
attempt to obscure bad news by burying it in financial statement footnotes.  
Alternatively, firms held by institutional investors may try to please institutions by 
providing more timely or transparent disclosures, or institutional investors may 
initially choose to invest in firms that they determine provide high quality 
disclosures.  Firms whose restatements involve the SEC directly should also be more 
likely to comply with the SEC rule to disclose news of a restatement on an 8-K 
filing.  This leads to the following hypothesis concerning the effect of institutional 
ownership and SEC monitoring on restatement disclosure choice: 
H3a: Firms monitored by institutional investors or the SEC are more 
likely to openly disclose news of a restatement on a Form 8-K filing. 
Consistent with the evidence discussed above concerning the impact of 
corporate governance on disclosure quality, I expect board structure and 
independence to affect the choice to alert investors and regulators of a restatement 
with a Form 8-K filing.  Firms with more independent boards should be more likely 
to disclose restatement news on a Form 8-K. 
H3b: Firms with a board chair who is not the CEO and firms with a 
higher proportion of outsiders on the audit committee are more likely to 
openly disclose a restatement with an 8-K filing. 
Efendi et al. (2007) and Burns and Kedia (2006) provide evidence that the 
sensitivity of a CEO’s personal wealth to his or her firm’s stock price may encourage 
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misreporting that benefits the CEO at the expense of long-term shareholder value.  If 
managers or directors believe that obscure restatement disclosures may temporarily 
delay the market reaction to restatement news, they may try to hide restatement news 
to benefit their personal wealth.  I thus expect CEO and director stock holdings to 
impact restatement disclosure strategy as follows: 
H3c: The amount of stock held by the CEO and the board of directors is 
negatively related to the probability of openly announcing a restatement 
on a Form 8-K filing. 
Since there was no requirement to disclose a restatement on a Form 8-K prior 
to the new SEC rule, it does not follow that good corporate governance or external 
monitoring by regulators or institutional investors would make disclosing a 
restatement on a Form 8-K more likely in the pre-rule period.  Prior to the rule, I 
should not find evidence that the 8-K decision is related to corporate governance or 
external monitoring.   
H3d: Prior to the SEC rule mandating a Form 8-K filing for restatements, 
the decision to announce a restatement on a Form 8-K is unrelated to 
corporate governance or external monitoring. 
If firms that restate without a Form 8-K filing are attempting to obscure or 
bury news of their restatements, then I should observe an absence of a company-
issued press release concerning the restatement whenever an 8-K is not filed.  
Additionally, if failing to alert the market of a restatement with a Form 8-K filing 
actually helps conceal news of a restatement, I should fail to find discussion of the 
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restatement in other media sources when an 8-K is not filed.  For example, Dow 
Jones News Services monitors 8-K filings and issues a “corporate filing alert” on the 
business wires when a restatement is disclosed on a Form 8-K filing.  Other 
newspapers and magazines in the business press, including The Wall Street Journal,  
frequently highlight companies who restate their previously issued financial 
statements.  Consequently, I expect to find less discussion of restatements outside of 
SEC filings when the restatement is performed without 8-K filings: 
H3e: Restatements performed without an accompanying 8-K filing are 
less likely to be disclosed in a press release or mentioned in the business 
press. 
 According to the theoretical arguments presented above in Bloomfield (2002) 
and Hirschleifer and Teoh (2003), restatements disclosed obscurely in the footnotes 
of regularly scheduled SEC filings may result in less of an initial market reaction 
because the news is more difficult to uncover.  By contrast, restatements announced 
on Form 8-K filings are more transparent and more timely; thus, the market should 
react more strongly to those restatement announcements. 
H3f: Restatements performed without an accompanying 8-K filing are 









6.2 Research Design 
 
The logit model in Equation 3 tests Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c: 
FILED_8K j,t  = β0 + β1 LARGE_NEG j,t + β2 SMALL_NEG j,t + β3 SMALL_POS j,t +  
β4 LARGE_POS j,t + β5 NUM_YRS j,t + β6 IC_WEAK j,t +  
β7 PERVASIVE j,t + β8 LEASES j,t + β9 HORIZON j,t +  
β10 NO_AMEND j,t + β11 SEC j,t + β12 INST_OWNERSHIP j,t +  
β13 CEO_CHAIR j,t + β14 AUD_INDEP j,t + β15 BOARD_SHARES j,t +  
β16 CEO_SHARES j,t + β17 LEV j,t + β18 ROA j,t + β19 M/B j,t +  
β20 EARN_VAR j,t + β21 LOGTA j,t + ε j,t 
  
The dependent variable (FILED_8K) in Equation 3 is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the restatement was disclosed on a Form 8-K, and 0 otherwise.  Since 
all restatements in this sample correct accounting errors in the primary financial 
statements and are announced after the effective date of the SEC’s Final Rule on 
Additional 8-K Disclosures, each restatement should have been disclosed on an 8-K 
filing.  The new SEC rule makes clear that managers cannot argue that a 
misstatement was material enough to require a restatement yet immaterial enough to 
avoid the need to alert investors to the restatement with a Form 8-K filing. 
Several variables in Equation 3 capture the severity or materiality of the 
restatement: NUM_YRS, the number of periods corrected by the restatement; 
PERVASIVE, the number of financial statement categories that were misstated; and 
IC_WEAK, an indicator variable that represents whether the firm disclosed a 
material weakness in internal controls in connection with the restatement.  All else 
equal, these proxies for restatement materiality should be positively related to the 
decision to disclose the restatement on an 8-K because failure to properly alert 
(3) 
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investors of a more material restatement is more likely to attract the scrutiny of 
investors and regulators.   
Since a large number of firms were required to restate due to errors in lease 
accounting in 2005, managers likely believed that the potential costs of obscuring a 
restatement disclosure related to lease accounting outweighed the benefits.  
However, since managers may have believed lease-related restatements were benign, 
managers may have feared that investors had a greater chance of negatively 
misinterpreting these restatements, so I make no specific prediction for lease-related 
restatements (LEASES).   
I expect HORIZON to be negatively related to the choice to disclose a 
restatement on a Form 8-K because managers may have believed restatements 
correcting periods further back in time were less material or less relevant to 
investors.  Alternatively, restatement announcements that have been strategically 
delayed (i.e., have a long restatement horizon) may also be strategically obscured by 
managers who restate without an 8-K filing.  I expect the decision to restate openly 
on a Form 8-K to be positively related to the decision to file amended financial 
statements with the SEC, so the variable NO_AMEND (i.e., the absence of an 
amended filing) is expected to have a negative coefficient.  Amended filings are a 
transparent means of indicating nonreliance on past filings due to the correction of 
prior errors, and companies that restate transparently will use both an 8-K filing and 
an amended 10-K/A or 10-Q/A filing. 
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I expect both variables representing external monitoring (SEC, 
INST_OWNERSHIP) to be positively related to the decision to announce the 
restatement on an 8-K filing.  Institutional investors are sophisticated users of 
financial information and are likely to search SEC filings for “current events” 
disclosed on 8-K filings.  I expect CEO_CHAIR to be negatively related to the 
choice to file an 8-K and AUD_INDEP to be positively related to announcing a 
restatement on an 8-K.  CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
chair of the restating company’s board of directors is also the CEO, a proxy for weak 
corporate governance or the influence of the CEO on the board of directors, and 0 
otherwise; and AUD_INDEP is the proportion of the company’s audit committee 
that is comprised of independent outsiders. 
The compensation variables (BOARD_SHARES and CEO_SHARES) 
represent a connection between the personal wealth of directors or CEOs and the 
company stock price.  I expect both compensation variables to be negatively related 
to the choice to openly disclose the restatement on a Form 8-K, consistent with 
evidence in Efendi et al. (2007) and Burns and Kedia (2006) that wealth sensitivity 
to stock price may induce misreporting by managers. 
In Equation 4, I use a logit model to examine the determinants of the choice 
to disclose a restatement on a Form 8-K prior to the SEC rule that mandated 8-K 
filings for restatements.  The sample of restatements used to test Hypothesis 3d in 
Equation 4 consists of 112 restatements announced between January 1, 2003, and the 
effective date of the SEC rule, August 24, 2004. 
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FILED_8K j,t  = β0 + β1 NEG_IMPACT j,t + β2 POS_IMPACT j,t + β3 NUM_YRS j,t + 
β4 IC_WEAK j,t + β5 PERVASIVE j,t + β6 LEASES j,t + β7 HORIZON j,t + 
β8 NO_AMEND j,t + β9 SEC j,t + β10 INST_OWNERSHIP j,t +  
β11 CEO_CHAIR j,t + β12 AUD_INDEP j,t + β13 LEV j,t + β14 ROA j,t +  
β15 M/B j,t + β16 EARN_VAR j,t + β17 LOGTA j,t + ε j,t 
 
 The dependent variable in Equation 4 (FILED_8K) is the same as in Equation 
3.  In Equation 4, however, since the number of restatements is smaller than the post-
SEC rule sample, I divide the restatements into only three categories: positive, 
negative, and zero-impact.  The primary expectation for Equation 4 is that because 8-
K filings were not required for restatements prior to August 2004, I do not expect the 
monitoring variables (SEC, INST_OWNERSHIP, CEO_CHAIR, and AUD_INDEP) 
to be significantly related to the decision to file an 8-K. 
The logistic regression model in Equation 5 tests the association between several 
restatement attributes—including the failure to disclose the restatement on an 8-K 
filing—and the existence of a company-issued press release or other media coverage 
of the restatement: 
NO_PRESS j,t  = β0 + β1 LARGE_NEG j,t + β2 SMALL_NEG j,t + β3 SMALL_POS j,t + 
β4 LARGE_POS j,t + β5 NUM_YRS j,t + β6 IC_WEAK j,t + β7 PERVASIVE j,t 
+ β8 LEASES j,t + β9 HORIZON j,t + β10 OBSCURE_1 j,t  
+ β11 OBSCURE_2 j,t + β12 SEC j,t + β13 INST_OWNERSHIP j,t + β13 
CEO_CHAIR j,t + β14 AUD_INDEP j,t + β15 BOARD_SHARES j,t + β16 
CEO_SHARES j,t + β17 LEV j,t + β18 ROA j,t + β19 M/B j,t + β20 EARN_VAR j,t 
+ β21 LOGTA j,t + ε j, t 
 
In Equation 5, the dependent variable (NO_PRESS) is an indicator variable 




wires and the business press failed to turn up any reference to the restatement.18  
Once again, my expectation is that the failure to disclose the restatement on a Form 
8-K will be positively related to the absence of a press release or media mention of 
the restatement.  In other words, restatements that are difficult to find within SEC 
filings should also be difficult to find outside SEC filings.   
Two indicator variables in Equation 5 represent the transparency of the 
restatement disclosure within SEC filings: OBSCURE_1 and OBSCURE_2.  
OBSCURE_1 represents restatements that were disclosed only in the footnotes of 
regularly scheduled financial statements (i.e., the most obscure way to disclose a 
restatement in SEC filings).  OBSCURE_2 represents restatements disclosed with 
amended financial statements but without an 8-K filing (i.e., the second most obscure 
way to disclose a restatement in SEC filings). 
Finally, the OLS regression model in Equation 6 investigates the 
determinants of the initial market reaction to restatement announcements.   
RET j,t  = β0 + β1 LARGE_NEG j,t + β2 SMALL_NEG j,t + β3 SMALL_POS j,t +  
β4 LARGE_POS j,t + β5 NUM_YRS j,t + β6 IC_WEAK j,t + β7 LEASES j,t +  
β8 PERVASIVE j,t + β9 HORIZON j,t + β10 OBSCURE_1 j,t +  
β11 OBSCURE_2 j,t + β12 SEC j,t + β13 INST_OWNERSHIP j,t +  
β14 LEV j,t + β15 ROA j,t + β16 M/B j,t + β17 EARN_VAR j,t +β18 LOGTA j,t +  
ε j, t 
 
The dependent variable in Equation 6 represents the size-adjusted buy-and-
hold abnormal returns surrounding the day of the initial public announcement of the 
                                                 
18 See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the process used to search for coverage of the 
restatements outside SEC filings. 
(6) 
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restatement.  The returns are cumulated over a (-2, 2) day window around the 
announcement.19  I expect the coefficients on LARGE_NEG and SMALL_NEG to 
be negative, since the market usually reacts negatively to an announcement that 
income was previously overstated (Palmrose et al. 2004).  The magnitude of the 
coefficient on LARGE_NEG should also be larger than the coefficient on 
SMALL_NEG.  I do not make a prediction for the coefficients on SMALL_POS and 
LARGE_POS because other researchers have shown the market reaction to income-
increasing restatements is not significantly different from zero (Callen et al. 2006).   
Restatements that are disclosed obscurely may result in a smaller or less-
negative initial market reaction because they are more difficult for investors to 
identify.  Additionally, prior evidence in this paper suggests that obscure restatement 
disclosures are often less timely than transparent disclosures.  Thus, I predict positive 
coefficients for both OBSCURE_1 and OBSCURE_2.  I expect SEC involvement in 
a restatement to indicate a more severe restatement, so I predict a negative 
coefficient on SEC.  However, it is unclear how institutional ownership will affect 
the initial reaction to a restatement announcement; so I do not make a prediction for 
the coefficient on INST_OWNERSHIP.  The next section discusses the results of 
each hypothesis test. 
6.3 Results for Hypotheses H3a – H3f  
 
Table 7 presents the results of several univariate tests of the differences 
between restatements disclosed with or without a Form 8-K filing.  Table 7 Panel A 
                                                 
19 Similarly, Hribar et al. (2004) use a (-2, 2) window to analyze the short-term market reaction to 
restatement announcements. 
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divides the sample based on the decision to restate with or without a Form 8-K filing 
and compares the means and medians of key variables in the two samples.  Panel A 
shows that 75 percent (619 of 823) of the restatements in my main sample were 
disclosed on an Item 4.02 Form 8-K.  Restatements disclosed on a Form 8-K filing 
have a significantly more negative impact on retained earnings (IMPACT_RE) than 
restatements disclosed without an 8-K (mean impact of -11 percent compared to 
mean impact of -6 percent), and restatement disclosed on an 8-K also correct longer 
periods (NUM_YRS) of misstatements (mean of 2.16 years compared to mean of 
1.74 years).  These results indicate that firms were more likely to disclose a 
restatement on a Form 8-K if the restatement had a large, negative impact on retained 
earnings and the misstatement persisted for long periods of time. 
Tests of HORIZON reveal that restatements disclosed on a Form 8-K filing 
are announced significantly closer to the last period misstated (median of 151 days 
compared to median of 397 days), and tests of PERVASIVE indicate that 
restatements disclosed on an 8-K affect a significantly higher number of categories 
of accounting errors.  The mean and median tests find no significant differences 
across the 8-K and no 8-K samples for market value of equity (MVE), total assets 
(ASSETS), earnings variability (EARN_VAR), market-to-book ratio (M/B), return 
on assets (ROA), and financial leverage (LEV).20 
                                                 
20 The failure to find a significant difference in the size (ASSETS or MVE) of firms that restate with 
or without a Form 8-K alleviates concerns about the no 8-K sample being disproportionately 
comprised of small firms that may not understand SEC reporting requirements as well as large firms. 
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Panel B compares the distribution of categorical variables between the 8-K 
and no 8-K samples.  Restatements filed with an 8-K filing were more likely to have 
a negative impact on retained earnings (67 percent compared to 50 percent), and 
restatements disclosed without an 8-K filing were also more likely to be performed 
without amended financial statements (58 percent compared to 41 percent).  This 
latter result suggests that 8-K filings and amended financial statements complement 
each other instead of being substitutes for each other.  In other words, firms that 
desire to transparently disclose a restatement will use both amended financial 
statements and an 8-K filing; but firms wishing to obscure the disclosure will use 
neither. 
Disclosures of a material weakness in internal controls (IC_WEAK) were 
significantly more likely for restatements that occurred with an 8-K filing (73 
percent compared to 36 percent).21  Restatements disclosed on an 8-K were also 
significantly more likely to be related to lease accounting (LEASES), but there is no 
significant difference in the proportion of restatements that correct annual periods 
(i.e., as opposed to only interim periods) or the proportion of restatements that 
directly involved the SEC.  Panel C of Table 7 compares the industry composition of 
the two samples.  While there is a marginally significant difference in the overall 
industry composition of the two samples, tests of the proportion of each sample from 
                                                 
21 Although the descriptive results indicate that restatements disclosed without an 8-K filing have 
significantly lower measures of restatement pervasiveness and significantly lower incidences of a 
disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls, these measures alone do not determine the 
necessity of an 8-K filing.  The Final Rule on 8-K Disclosures requires an 8-K filing for all 
restatements that correct accounting errors in the primary financial statements. 
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each industry group failed to find any significant differences for any of the industry 
groupings.  Restatement disclosure strategy does not appear to be driven by industry-
specific trends for disclosing restatements with or without a Form 8-K. 
In summary, the univariate statistics in Table 7 indicate that the severity of 
the restatement is positively related to the decision to alert investors to a restatement 
with a Form 8-K filing.  Large restatements, restatements connected to a disclosure 
of a material weakness in internal controls, and restatements that negatively affected 
retained earnings are all more likely to be disclosed on a Form 8-K filing.  
Descriptive evidence also indicates that restatements disclosed on an 8-K are 
announced significantly closer to the last period misstated, consistent with a more 
timely disclosure.  However, firm size, industry affiliation, leverage, recent 
accounting performance, growth expectations, and earnings variability are not 
significantly different across the samples of firms that restate with or without an 8-K 
filing.  The next set of analyses examine these relations in a more conclusive 
multivariate setting. 
The results in Table 8 Panels A, B, and C provide mixed support for 
Hypotheses 3a and  3b concerning the impact of monitoring and governance on 
restatement disclosure strategy, but they do not support Hypothesis 3c concerning 
the impact of compensation on disclosure strategy.  In Panel A, which includes the 
full sample of 823 restatement observations, SEC monitoring is not significantly 
related to the choice to disclose the restatement on a Form 8-K filing.  The 
significantly positive coefficients on LARGE_NEG, SMALL_NEG, and 
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LARGE_POS indicate that, all else equal, small income-increasing restatements are 
the least likely to be announced on a Form 8-K filing.  This result may indicate that 
firms believe small income-increasing restatements are less material to investors than 
the other types of restatements. 
Restatements that impact more periods (NUM_YRS) or are connected with a 
disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls (IC_WEAK) are more likely to 
be disclosed on an 8-K, but restatements performed with no amended filings 
(NO_AMEND) are less than half as likely as restatements that include amended 
financial statements to be disclosed on a Form 8-K.  The negative relation between 
NO_AMEND and FILED_8K confirms that beyond choosing not to file an 8-K, 
most companies that do not announce a restatement on an 8-K eventually disclose 
the restatement only in the footnotes of regular SEC filings without filing amended 
financial statements.  HORIZON is negatively related to the probability of alerting 
investors of a restatement with a Form 8-K filing, indicating that firms were less 
likely to file an 8-K for restatements that corrected periods further back in time. 
Data requirements for the second and third logit models in Table 8 Panels B 
and C reduce the number of observations used in each test.22  In the second model, 
monitoring by the SEC or institutional investors is positively related to the 
probability of disclosing a restatement on a Form 8-K.  Additionally, as 
hypothesized, CEO duality (i.e., the CEO functions as both chair of the board of 
                                                 
22 Data on CEO duality (CEO_CHAIR) and audit committee independence (AUD_INDEP) was 
gathered from the Board Analyst database, which covers approximately 2000 of the largest public 
companies.  Data on the shares held by CEOs and audit committee members comes from ExecuComp, 
which covers substantially fewer firms than the Compustat Annual database. 
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directors and CEO) is negatively related to the decision to openly disclose a 
restatement on a Form 8-K.   The odds ratio on CEO_CHAIR (0.25) indicates that 
these firms are only one-fourth as likely to disclose a restatement on an 8-K as firms 
that have separate CEOs and board chairs.  The proportion of the audit committee 
that is comprised of outsiders (AUD_INDEP) is not significantly related to the 
decision to disclose a restatement on a Form 8-K.   
In the third logit model in Panel C, the signs on SEC, INST_OWNERSHIP, 
and CEO_CHAIR are the same as in the second model, but INST_OWNERSHIP is 
not statistically significant in this model.  This model also finds no support for 
Hypothesis 3c: there is not a significant association between BOARD_SHARES or 
CEO_SHARES and the decision to announce a restatement on a Form 8-K filing.  
Although other papers have found significant results for the impact of CEO wealth 
sensitivity on other forms of misreporting, this effect does not appear to significantly 
influence the way firms disclose a restatement in my sample.23 
The logistic regression model in Table 8 Panel D examines the determinants 
of 8-K filings for 112 restatements announced prior to the new SEC rule.  Prior to the 
new SEC rule, an 8-K filing was not required for restatements, but firms could 
choose to disclose restatements on an 8-K.  In Panel D, the results show that prior to 
the SEC rule, income-decreasing restatements (NEG_IMPACT), income-increasing 
restatements (POS_IMPACT), and restatements covering longer periods of time 
                                                 
23 Based on evidence in Efendi et al. (2007) and Burns and Kedia (2006), I also tested the association 
between the number and value of CEO “in-the-money” options and the choice to disclose a 
restatement on a Form 8-K filing.  I did not find a significant relation between options and disclosure 
choice. 
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(NUM_YRS) were all more likely than their counterparts to be disclosed on a Form 
8-K.  Restatements related to lease accounting were also less likely to be reported on 
a Form 8-K.    
Importantly, none of the external monitoring or corporate governance 
variables in this model is significant, suggesting that prior to the SEC rule, the filing 
of an 8-K for restatements was not necessarily the result of good corporate 
governance or monitoring by outsiders.  Firms may have used simple rules of thumb 
concerning the impact of the restatement on earnings to determine whether a 
restatement warranted an 8-K filing.  The results in Panel D are generally consistent 
with Hypothesis 3d. 
The results of the logistic regression model in Table 9 are consistent with 
Hypothesis 3e.  These results indicate that restatements disclosed obscurely within 
SEC filings are much less likely to be disclosed or discussed outside of SEC filings.  
Specifically, restatements disclosed in only the footnotes of regularly scheduled SEC 
filings (OBSCURE_1) were 11 times more likely than restatements disclosed on an 
8-K filing to have no accompanying press release or media mention.  Restatements 
performed with amended financial statements but no 8-K filing were also more than 
five times as likely to receive no mention outside the SEC filings as restatements 
disclosed with an 8-K filing.  This result provides strong evidence of a potential 
motivation for failing to disclose a restatement on a Form 8-K: a desire to keep news 
of the restatement out of the media.  This finding is also further evidence that 
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choosing not to alert investors or regulators of a restatement on a Form 8-K filing is 
a strategic reporting decision.   
Additional results in Table 9 indicate that restatements with a negative impact 
on retained earnings (LARGE_NEG, SMALL_NEG) and restatements with a large 
positive impact on earnings (LARGE_POS) are more likely than zero-impact 
restatements and small positive restatements to be disclosed outside SEC filings.  A 
longer period of misstatement (NUM_YRS), and a related disclosure of a material 
weakness in internal controls (IC_WEAK) also increase the probability that a 
restatement will be disclosed in a press release or receive media coverage.  A longer 
restatement horizon (HORIZON), however, decreases the likelihood that a 
restatement is mentioned in the media.  Overall, the results in Table 9 confirm that 
the level of transparency with which a restatement is disclosed within SEC filings is 
highly related to the probability that a restatement is disclosed outside SEC filings in 
a company-issued press release or other form of media coverage. 
Finally, Table 10 presents the results of an OLS regression model that 
analyzes the size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns in a five-day window 
surrounding the initial public announcement of a restatement.  In Hypothesis 3f, I 
predict that restatements disclosed obscurely will result in a smaller initial market 
reaction because they are more difficult for investors to identify.  The results in 
Table 10 provide only weak support for this hypothesis.  The coefficient on 
OBSCURE_1 is not significantly different from zero, but the coefficient on 
OBSCURE_2 is marginally significantly positive.  This result provides some support 
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for the idea that obscure restatements receive a less negative initial reaction than 
restatements disclosed openly on a Form 8-K filing. 
These results may also indicate that, because markets are efficient, the 
differences in restatement disclosure transparency I investigate are not significant 
enough to impact the market reaction to restatement announcements.  As expected, 
the results in Table 10 also indicate that the market reaction to restatement 
announcements is most negative for large negative restatements (LARGE_NEG), 
followed by small negative restatements (SMALL_NEG).  Restatements related to 
lease accounting also received a less negative market reaction than other 
restatements. 
 
Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion 
 This paper provides new evidence concerning the strategic choices firms 
make when disclosing accounting restatements.  Restatements in my sample correct 
accounting errors in previously issued financial statements and were announced after 
a new SEC rule (effective August 24, 2004) intended to make restatement 
disclosures more timely and transparent to outsiders.  In tests of whether firms 
strategically “mix” restatement news with earnings news, I find that firms most often 
package small, income-decreasing restatements with positive earnings surprises.  
This result is consistent with managers’ attempting to neutralize or offset a negative 
market reaction to the restatement announcement with a positive reaction to the 
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earnings surprise.   Direct SEC involvement in the restatement makes firms less 
likely to mix a restatement announcement with an earnings release. 
Using the number of days that elapse between the end of the last period 
misstated and the initial public announcement of a restatement, I estimate a hazard 
model to analyze the timeliness of restatement announcements.  After controlling for 
other determinants of disclosure timeliness, I find that obscure restatement 
disclosures are less timely than transparent disclosures, and announcements of 
income-decreasing restatements are delayed longer than announcements of 
restatements with no effect or a positive effect on income.  In other words, firms are 
more likely to quickly disclose and correct a large understatement of earnings than a 
large overstatement of earnings.  Institutional ownership is also positively related to 
the timeliness of restatement announcements. 
As hypothesized, I also find evidence that external monitoring by institutional 
investors or the SEC is positively related to the choice to openly disclose news of a 
restatement on an 8-K, but firms whose board chair also functions as the company 
CEO are only one-fourth as likely to disclose a restatement on an 8-K as firms that 
fill the board chair and CEO positions separately.  I do not find evidence that the 
probability of disclosing a restatement on a Form 8-K is related to the number of 
company shares held by the CEO or granted to nonemployee directors in the year 
prior to the restatement.   
Addressing the relevance of disclosure choices within SEC filings, I 
document that restatements disclosed most obscurely in SEC filings are also less 
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likely to be disclosed in a company-issued press release or in the business press.  
Restatements that are difficult to uncover in SEC filings are also difficult to identify 
in information sources outside SEC filings.  Finally, I find marginally significant 
evidence that restatements disclosed obscurely result in a less-negative initial market 
reaction, possibly due to the difficulty of identifying that a restatement has taken 
place. 
 This paper extends the prior literatures on strategic disclosure and accounting 
restatements by providing empirical evidence that external monitoring, corporate 
governance, and the size and direction of a restatement all influence restatement 
disclosure strategy.  I find that strategic reporting behavior centers around 
restatements that decrease previously reported income.  Holding materiality of the 
restatement constant, I document significant differences between firms that do or do 
not disclose accounting restatements in a transparent and timely manner.  I also 
provide evidence on the impact of the new SEC rule governing restatement 
disclosure practices.  While it appears that many firms circumvented the disclosure 
requirements by failing to file an Item 4.02 8-K, firms that complied with the 8-K 
filing requirement made significantly more timely disclosures of restatements than 
firms that restated without an 8-K.  Strong corporate governance and external 
monitoring are associated with greater compliance with the SEC disclosure rule, 




Distribution of Restatement Sample 
 





(Percent of Sample) 
Percent Announced on 
8-K Filings 
2004 Q3 31   (4%) 71% 
2004 Q4 112   (14%) 82% 
2005 Q1 319   (39%) 75% 
2005 Q2 156   (19%) 74% 
2005 Q3 97   (12%) 68% 
2005 Q4 108   (13%) 78% 
Total 823  
 









Manufacturing Industrial 193 23% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 181 22% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 109 13% 
Miscellaneous Services 98 12% 
Manufacturing Consumer 82 10% 
Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services 86 10% 
Mining and Construction 40 5% 
Professional Services 34 4% 
Total 823 100% 
 









Expense Recognition 252 31% 
Misclassification 130 16% 
Revenue Recognition 95 12% 
Equity 88 11% 
Tax Accounting 68 8% 
Equity - Other Comp. Income 52 6% 
Acquisitions / Investments 37 4% 
Capital Assets 31 4% 
Inventory 24 3% 
Other 20 2% 
Liabilities / Contingencies 13 2% 
Reserves / Allowances 13 2% 






Table 1 continued 
 







NASDAQ 413 50% 
NYSE 298 36% 
AMEX 89 11% 
OTC 23 3% 
Total 823 100% 
 
 
a Industry categorizations are based on descriptions of major divisions of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. 





Descriptive Statistics for Restatement Sample 
 
Panel A: Univariate statistics for continuous variables 
 
Variable N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Stdev 
IMPACT_RE 823 -0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.39 
NUM_YRS 823 2.06 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.31 
HORIZON 823 245 164 130 389 172 
PERVASIVE 823 1.60 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.09 
LEV 823 0.24 0.19 0.03 0.38 0.24 
ROA 823 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.17 
M/B 823 2.76 2.00 1.29 3.31 4.32 
EARN_VAR 823 108.1 10.4 3.4 39.7 440.5 
ASSETS ($mm) 823 3,758 431 107 1,802 12,544 
MVE ($mm) 823 1,988 345 98 1,362 5,301 
 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 





Descriptive Statistics for Restatement Sample by Direction of Restatement Impact 
 
Panel A: Comparison of means and medians of continuous variables 
 
 
 Restatement Impact    
       





Number of Periods Misstated (NUM_YRS)       
Mean 2.21  1.80  -4.40***  
Median 2.00  1.75   -3.82*** 
Observations 516  307    
Restatement Horizon (HORIZON)       
Mean 247  242  -0.39  
Median 167  156   -1.34 
Observations 516  307    
Number of Areas Restated (PERVASIVE)       
Mean 1.72  1.39  -4.53***  
Median 1.00  1.00   -4.63*** 
Observations 516  307    
Financial Leverage (LEV)       
Mean 0.23  0.26  1.28  
Median 0.18  0.22   1.68* 
Observations 516  307    
Return on Assets (ROA)       
Mean -0.02  -0.03  -0.61  
Median 0.02  0.01   -1.49 
Observations 516  307    
Market-to-Book (M/B)       
Mean 2.70  2.86  0.50  
Median 2.00  2.02   0.24 
Observations 516  307    
Ranked Earnings Variability (EARN_VAR)       
Mean 0.49  0.50  0.44  
Median 0.49  0.46   -0.33 
Observations 516  307    
Total Assets $mm (ASSETS)       
Mean 3,458  4,262  0.85  
Median 452  403   -0.48 
Observations 516  307    
Market Value of Equity (MVE)       
Mean 1,921  2,100  0.47  
Median 368  326   -0.48 







Table 3 continued 
 
Panel B: Test of differences in the distribution of discrete variables by direction of restatement impact 
 
 
 Restatement Impact   
      
Variable 
Negative 
(n=516)   
Non-Negative 
(n=307)   
Chi-Square 
Test 
Did Not File an Amended 10-K or 10-Q (NO_AMEND=1)      
Observations 268  102   
Percentage of sample 52%  33%  p < 0.01 
Restatement of Annual Period (ANNUAL=1)      
Observations 419  221   
Percentage of sample 81%  72%  p < 0.01 
SEC Involvement (SEC=1)      
Observations 34  17   
Percentage of sample 7%  6%  ns 
Internal Control Weakness (IC_WEAK=1)      
Observations 349  176   
Percentage of sample 68%  57%  p < 0.01 
Lease Accounting Related (LEASES=1)      
Observations 182  27   
Percentage of sample 35%  9%  p < 0.01 
 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.  
 
These descriptive statistics divide the restatement sample into two subsamples: those restatements that negatively 
impacted retained earnings (i.e., income was previously overstated) and those restatements that have either no 
impact or a positive impact on retained earnings..  
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hazard Model Examining Timeliness of Restatement Announcements  
 
Panels A,B: Cox proportional hazard model  
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
           




Ratio  Estimate  
Hazard 
Ratio  Estimate 
Restatement Attributes           
LARGE_NEG  -  0.80  -0.22  0.42  -0.86*** 
SMALL_NEG  ?  0.98  -0.02  0.64  -0.45** 
SMALL_POS  ?  1.14  0.13  0.92  -0.08 
LARGE_POS  +  1.18  0.16  0.67  -0.40 
NUM_YRS  -  1.01  0.01  0.92  -0.08* 
IC_WEAK  ?  1.10  0.10  0.99  -0.01 
PERVASIVE  -  1.00  -0.001  1.00  -0.002 
LEASES  ?  0.91  -0.09  0.94  -0.06 
Disclosure Transparency           
OBSCURE_1  -  0.35  -1.05***  0.34  -1.08*** 
OBSCURE_2  -  0.51  -0.67***  0.46  -0.77*** 
Monitoring           
SEC  ?  0.89  -0.12  0.91  -0.09 
INST_OWNERSHIP  +      1.46  0.38*** 
CEO_CHAIR  -      1.10  0.09 
AUD_INDEP  +      1.14  0.13 
Control Variables           
LEV  ?  1.41  0.34*  2.02  0.70*** 
ROA  ?  0.78  -0.24  2.36  0.86 
M/B  ?  1.00  0.004  1.00  0.001 
EARN_VAR  ?  0.68  -0.39**  0.80  -0.23 
LOGTA  ?  1.04  0.04**  1.10  0.10** 
           
Sample Size      823    249 
LR Chi-sq      163.9    63.2 
Prob > Chi-sq      0.00    0.00 
 
The hazard models in Table 6 Panels A and B use a Cox proportional hazard model to examine the relation between 
the timeliness of the initial public announcement of a restatement (i.e., HORIZON) and restatement size and 
direction and external monitoring.  The results of the full model including monitoring variables indicate that 
announcements of restatements that negatively impact retained earnings are delayed significantly longer than 
restatements with no impact or a positive impact on retained earnings.  Additionally, the most obscure restatement 
disclosures are delayed longer than more transparent disclosures; and the timeliness of initial restatement 
announcements is positively associated with the proportion of the firm held by institutional investors 
(INST_OWNERSHIP).  In all regressions, I use industry-level fixed effects and robust standard errors using the 
Huber (1967) / White (1980) procedure with industry-level clustering (Rogers 1993). 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
See Appendix for definitions of variables.
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Table 6 (contd) 
 
Panels C,D: Hazard model using Weibull distribution for hazard function 
 
    Panel C  Panel D 
           




Ratio  Estimate  
Hazard 
Ratio  Estimate 
Restatement Attributes           
LARGE_NEG  -  0.84  -0.18  0.38  -0.96*** 
SMALL_NEG  ?  1.01  0.01  0.66  -0.41* 
SMALL_POS  ?  1.19  0.18  1.03  0.03 
LARGE_POS  +  1.22  0.20  0.59  -0.52 
NUM_YRS  -  1.03  0.03  0.94  -0.07 
IC_WEAK  ?  1.13  0.12  1.05  0.05 
PERVASIVE  -  1.02  0.02  1.04  0.04 
LEASES  ?  0.88  -0.13  0.84  -0.17 
Disclosure Transparency           
OBSCURE_1  -  0.35  -1.05***  0.31  -1.16*** 
OBSCURE_2  -  0.51  -0.67***  0.45  -0.79*** 
Monitoring           
SEC  ?  0.92  -0.09  0.96  -0.04 
INST_OWNERSHIP  +      1.42  0.35 
CEO_CHAIR  -      1.08  0.07 
AUD_INDEP  +      1.12  0.11 
Control Variables           
LEV  ?  1.51  0.41*  2.16  0.77*** 
ROA  ?  0.75  -0.28*  1.98  0.68 
M/B  ?  1.00  0.004  1.01  0.01 
EARN_VAR  ?  0.67  -0.40  0.75  -0.29 
LOGTA  ?  1.02  0.02  1.07  0.07 
           
Sample Size      823    249 
LR Chi-sq      188.4    77.9 
Prob > Chi-sq      0.00    0.00 
 
 
The hazard models in Table 6 Panels C and D assume a Weibull distribution for the hazard function and examine the 
relation between the timeliness of the initial public announcement of a restatement (i.e., HORIZON) and restatement 
size and direction and external monitoring.  The results of the full model including all monitoring variables show 
that announcements of restatements that negatively impact retained earnings are delayed significantly longer than 
restatements with no impact or a positive impact on retained earnings.  Additionally, the most obscure restatement 
disclosures are delayed the longer than the more transparent disclosures.  In all regressions, I use industry-level fixed 
effects and robust standard errors using the Huber (1967) / White (1980) procedure with industry-level clustering 
(Rogers 1993). 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
See Appendix for definitions of variables. 
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TABLE 7 
Univariate Statistics Comparing Restatements Announced With or Without an 8-K Filing 
 
Panel A: Mean and median tests for continuous variables 
 
 Restatement Disclosure Choice    
       
Variable Yes 8-K   No 8-K   Mean Test Median Test 
Restatement Impact As % of Retained Earnings (IMPACT_RE)       
Mean -0.11  -0.06  2.13**  
Median -0.01  -0.0002   3.73*** 
Observations 619  204    
Number of Periods Misstated (NUM_YRS)       
Mean 2.16  1.74  -4.57***  
Median 2.00  2.00   -2.91*** 
Observations 619  204    
Restatement Horizon (HORIZON)       
Mean 205  367  10.62***  
Median 151  397   9.86*** 
Observations 619  204    
Number of Areas Restated (PERVASIVE)       
Mean 1.65  1.45  -2.43**  
Median 1.00  1.00   -2.79*** 
Observations 619  204    
Financial Leverage (LEV)       
Mean 0.24  0.24  -0.33  
Median 0.18  0.22   0.99 
Observations 619  204    
Return on Assets (ROA)       
Mean -0.02  -0.04  -1.13  
Median 0.02  0.01   -1.11 
Observations 619  204    
Market-to-Book (M/B)       
Mean 2.66  3.07  1.11  
Median 2.05  1.91   -1.43 
Observations 619  204    
Ranked Earnings Variability (EARN_VAR)       
Mean 0.48  0.51  1.17  
Median 0.48  0.53   0.67 
Observations 619  204    
Total Assets $mm (ASSETS)       
Mean 3,456  4,674  1.20  
Median 431  448   0.02 
Observations 619  204    
Market Value of Equity (MVE)       
Mean 1,834  2,453  1.34  
Median 382  308   -0.79 
Observations 619  204    
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Table 7 continued 
 
Panel B: Test of differences in the distribution of discrete variables by 8-K disclosure choice 
 
 Restatement Disclosure Choice   
      
Variable Yes 8-K (n=619)   No 8-K (n=204)   
Chi-Square 
Test 
Restatement Negatively Impacted Retained Earnings (NEG_IMPACT=1)      
Observations 413  103   
Percentage of sample 67%  50%  p < 0.01 
Did Not File an Amended 10-K or 10-Q (NO_AMEND=1)      
Observations 252  118   
Percentage of sample 41%  58%  p < 0.01 
Restatement of Annual Period (ANNUAL=1)      
Observations 482  158   
Percentage of sample 78%  77%  ns 
SEC Involvement (SEC=1)      
Observations 41  10   
Percentage of sample 7%  5%  ns 
Internal Control Weakness (IC_WEAK=1)      
Observations 452  73   
Percentage of sample 73%  36%  p < 0.01 
Lease Accounting Related (LEASES=1)      
Observations 174  35   
Percentage of sample 28%  17%  p < 0.01 
 
 
Panel C: Comparison of industry composition by 8-K disclosure choice 
 
  Restatement Disclosure Choice   
       
Industrya   Yes 8-K   No 8-K   Z-stat 
Mining and Construction       
Percentage of total observations in industry  3.88  6.86  0.42 
Number of observations  24  14   
Manufacturing Consumer       
Percentage of total observations in industry  9.85  10.29  0.06 
Number of observations  61  21   
Manufacturing Industrial       
Percentage of total observations in industry  21.97  27.94  0.89 
Number of observations  136  21   
Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services       
Percentage of total observations in industry  9.37  13.73  0.62 
Number of observations  58  28   
Wholesale and Retail Trade       
Percentage of total observations in industry  23.75  16.67  -0.90 
Number of observations  147  34   
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Table 7 continued       
       
Industrya   Yes 8-K   No 8-K   Z-stat 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate       
Percentage of total observations in industry  14.22  10.29  -0.48 
Number of observations  88  21   
Miscellaneous Services       
Percentage of total observations in industry  12.60  9.80  -0.34 
Number of observations  78  20   
Professional Services       
Percentage of total observations in industry  4.04  3.92  -0.02 
Number of observations  25  8   
Chi-square test of differences in overall distribution       
(9 degrees of freedom) = 15.41*       
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.  
 
a Industry categorizations are based on descriptions of major divisions of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Logistic Regression Predicting the Absence of Restatement Disclosures Outside of SEC Filings 
 




Ratio  Estimate 
Restatement Attributes       
LARGE_NEG  -  0.58  -0.55* 
SMALL_NEG  -  0.37  -1.01*** 
SMALL_POS  ?  0.88  -0.13 
LARGE_POS  ?  0.64  -0.45* 
NUM_YRS  -  0.68  -0.39*** 
IC_WEAK  -  0.44  -0.83*** 
LEASES  -  0.59  -0.53 
PERVASIVE  -  1.02  0.02 
HORIZON  +  1.00  0.002*** 
Disclosure Transparency       
OBSCURE_1  +  11.14  2.41*** 
OBSCURE_2  +  5.29  1.67*** 
Monitoring       
SEC  -  0.72  -0.33 
INST_OWNERSHIP  -  0.61  -0.50 
Control Variables       
LEV  ?  1.68  0.52 
ROA  ?  1.70  0.53 
M/B  ?  1.02  0.02 
EARN_VAR  ?  0.81  -0.21 
LOGTA  -  0.92  -0.08 
       
Sample Size      650 
Pseudo R-Square      0.34 
Percent Correctly Classified      86.2% 
 
The logistic regression model in Table 9 analyzes the determinants of press coverage of accounting 
restatements.  The dependent variable, NO_PRESS, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if I found no 
company-initiated press release or any other press coverage concerning the restatement, and 0 
otherwise.  For each restatement in my sample, I conducted an exhaustive search for media coverage 
using (1) the results of the GAO (2006) Lexis Nexis search for restatement announcements in the 
press during the same time period; (2) keyword searches of over 4500 news sources on Google News; 
and (3) keyword searches on Factiva to investigate the business wires, press-release wires, and The 
Wall Street Journal.  The results in Table 8 indicate that restatements disclosed the most obscurely in 
SEC filings were also the least likely to be disclosed or discussed in the press.  Additionally, small 
positive restatements are the least likely to be discussed in the press.  In all regressions, I use industry-
level fixed effects and robust standard errors using the Huber (1967) / White (1980) procedure with 
industry-level clustering (Rogers 1993). 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
See Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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TABLE 10 
Determinants of the Initial Market Reaction to Restatement Announcements 
 
 
Independent Variable  
Predicted 
Sign  Estimate  
Std. 
Error 
Restatement Attributes       
LARGE_NEG  -  -0.04**  0.01 
SMALL_NEG  -  -0.02**  0.01 
SMALL_POS  ?  0.01  0.01 
LARGE_POS  ?  -0.01  0.01 
NUM_YRS  -  0.01***  0.00 
IC_WEAK  -  -0.002  0.00 
LEASES  +  0.02**  0.01 
PERVASIVE  -  -0.002  0.00 
HORIZON  +  0.00  0.00 
Disclosure Transparency       
OBSCURE_1  +  0.01  0.01 
OBSCURE_2  +  0.02*  0.01 
Monitoring       
SEC  -  -0.03  0.02 
INST_OWNERSHIP  ?  -0.002  0.01 
Control Variables       
LEV  ?  0.02  0.01 
ROA  ?  0.02  0.01 
M/B  ?  0.00  0.00 
EARN_VAR  ?  0.001  0.02 
LOGTA  ?  0.00  0.00 
       
Sample Size  634     
R-Squared  0.10     
 
The OLS regression model in Table 10 analyzes the size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
surrounding the day of the initial public announcement of the restatements.  The results in Table 9 are 
for a (-2, 2) window surrounding the restatement announcement date.  As shown in Table 9, I find 
some evidence that restatements disclosed more obscurely receive a marginally less negative market 
reaction during the initial announcement window than restatements disclosed openly.  The market 
reaction to restatement announcements is significantly most negative for large, negative restatements 
(-4 percent) and small, negative restatements (-2 percent).  Restatements related to lease accounting 
also received a less negative market reaction than other restatements. In all regressions, I use industry-
level fixed effects and robust standard errors using the Huber (1967) / White (1980) procedure with 
industry-level clustering (Rogers 1993). 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
See Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions (alphabetical) 
 
ABS_IMPACT is the absolute value of the cumulative impact of the restatement, as 
a proportion of retained earnings.  The author hand-collected this information 
from SEC filings pertaining to the restatement. 
ANNUAL is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement corrects at least 
one annual (10-K) filing, and 0 if the restatement corrects only interim (10-Q) 
fillings. 
ASSETS is the dollar value (in millions) of total assets (Compustat item 6) as 
reported in the last 10-K filing prior to the restatement announcement. 
AUD_INDEP represents the proportion of directors serving on the audit committee 
who are characterized as outsiders by Board Analyst. 
AUDIT_SWITCH is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restating firm changed 
external auditors in the year prior to the restatement and 0 otherwise. 
BOARD_OUT is the proportion of the board of directors that were outside members 
in the year prior to the restatement announcement, as defined by Board 
Analyst. 
BOARD_SHARES is the number of shares of stock (including restricted stock) that 
were granted to each nonemployee director during the year prior to the 
restatement announcement, as indicated on the ExecuComp database. 
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable that equals 1 if Board Analyst reports that the 
CEO of the restating company is also the chair of the board of directors and 0 
otherwise. 
CEO_SHARES is the number of shares of company stock (including restricted 
stock) held by the CEO in the year prior to the restatement announcement, as 
reported on the ExecuComp database. 
EARN_ANNC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if news of a restatement was 
publicly disclosed on the same day as an earnings announcement and 0 
otherwise. 
EARN_VAR is the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat item 18) for the three years prior to the year of the restatement 
announcement.  In the regression models, this variable is rank transformed to 
lie between 0 and 1. 
FILED_8K is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement was disclosed on 
an Item 4.02 Form 8-K (as required by the SEC’s Final Rule on 8-K 
Disclosures for all material restatements) and 0 otherwise. 
HORIZON is the number of days that elapse between the last day of the final period 
misstated and the date of the initial public disclosure of the restatement. 
IC_WEAK is an indicator variable that, in the full sample of 823 observations, 
equals 1 if the restating company disclosed a material weakness in internal 
controls in the year before or the year after the restatement announcement 
and 0 otherwise.  In regression models with less than the full 823 
 75 
observations, IC_WEAK represents whether a material weakness in internal 
controls was disclosed in the year prior to the announcement. 
IMPACT_RE is the cumulative impact of the restatement, as a proportion of 
retained earnings.  The author hand-collected this information from SEC 
filings pertaining to the restatement. 
INST_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the restating firm’s outstanding shares 
that are held by institutional investors in the quarterly reporting period prior 
to the restatement. 
LARGE_NEG is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the impact of the restatement 
on retained earnings was in the bottom (most negative) 10 percent of the 
distribution of restatement impacts and 0 otherwise. 
LARGE_POS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the impact of the restatement 
on retained earnings was in the top (most positive) 10 percent of the 
distribution of restatement impacts and 0 otherwise. 
LEASES is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement was related to errors 
in accounting for leases and 0 otherwise. 
LEV is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (Compustat 
item 34) scaled by total assets (Compustat item 6), as reported on the last 
annual filing before the restatement announcement. 
LOGTA is the natural log of total assets (Compustat item 6), as reported on the last 
annual filing before the restatement announcement. 
M/B is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of equity (Compustat 
item 25 multiplied by item 199) divided by the book value of equity 
(Compustat item 60), as reported in the last annual filing before the 
restatement announcement. 
MVE is the market value of equity (Compustat item 25 multiplied by item 199), as 
reported in the last annual filing before the restatement announcement. 
NEG_IMPACT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the cumulative impact of the 
restatement on retained earnings is negative and 0 if the restatement does not 
impact retained earnings or has a positive cumulative impact on retained 
earnings. 
NO_AMEND is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement was performed 
without filing any amended forms (e.g., 10-K/A or 10-Q/A) and 0 otherwise.  
Companies that restate previously issued financial statements without 
amended forms make their corrections in regularly scheduled 10-Q or 10-K 
filings. 
NO_PRESS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if I found no discussion of the 
restatement outside of SEC filings: i.e., no press release and no other media 
coverage of the restatement, and 0 otherwise.  For each restatement in my 
sample, I conducted an exhaustive search for disclosures outside SEC filings 
using (1) the results of the GAO (2006) Lexis Nexis search of restatement 
announcements in the press; (2) keyword searches of over 4,500 news 
 76 
sources on Google News; and (3) keyword searches on Factiva to investigate 
the business wires, press-release wires, and The Wall Street Journal. 
NO_8K is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restating company did not 
disclose its restatement on a Form 8-K filing and 0 otherwise. 
NUM_YRS is the cumulative number of misstated periods corrected by the 
restatement.  Each annual period restated is a value of 1 and each additional 
interim period restated is 0.25. 
OBSCURE_1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement was disclosed 
in the most obscure manner: only in a footnote to a regularly scheduled 10-K 
or 10-Q filing with no amended financial statements and no 8-K filing, and 0 
otherwise. 
OBSCURE_2 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement was disclosed 
in the second most obscure manner: with amended financial statements but 
without any 8-K filing, and 0 otherwise. 
OBSCURE_3 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement was disclosed 
in the least obscure manner: with an 8-K filing, and 0 otherwise. 
PERVASIVE is the number of financial statement categories affected by the 
restatement (e.g., expense recognition, inventory, revenue recognition, etc.).  
See Table 1 Panel C for a full list of restatement categories. 
POS_IMPACT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement had a positive 
impact on retained earnings and 0 otherwise. 
ROA is return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat 
item 18) scaled by total assets (Compustat item 6), as reported on the last 
annual filing before the restatement announcement. 
SEC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was involved in the restatement (informal inquiry or 
formal investigation) and 0 otherwise. 
SMALL_NEG is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the impact of the restatement 
on retained earnings was between zero and the 10th percentile (most negative) 
of the distribution of restatement impacts and 0 otherwise. 
SMALL_POS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the impact of the restatement 
on retained earnings was between zero and the 90th percentile (most positive) 
of the distribution of restatement impacts and 0 otherwise. 
SUE is standardized unexpected earnings for firms that announce a restatement on 
the same day as an earnings announcement.  SUE is calculated as the 
difference between the actual earnings number and the median of analysts’ 
forecasts in the month prior to the earnings announcement on the IBES 





Abbott, L.J., Parker, S., and Peters, G.F. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and 
restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory Vol. 23, No.1 
(March): 69-87. 
 
Aboody, D. and R. Kasznik. 2000. CEO stock option awards and the timing of 
corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: 
73-100. 
 
Ai, C. and E.C. Norton. 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. 
Economics Letters 80: 123-129. 
 
Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., and Sengupta, P. 2005. The association between outside 
directors, institutional investors, and the properties of management earnings 
forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 43 No.3 (June): 343-375. 
 
Audit Analytics. 2006. Financial restatements dashboard: annual results for 2001-
2005, analysis of first 6 months of 2006. p. 5 
 
Baber, W.R., Kang, S.H., and Liang, L. 2005. Strong boards, management 
entrenchment, and accounting restatement. Working paper. George 
Washington University. 
 
Bagnoli, M., Clement, M., and Watts, S.G. 2006. Around-the-clock media coverage 
and the timing of earnings announcements. Working paper. The University of 
Texas at Austin. 
 
Bloomfield, R.J. 2002. The “incomplete revelation hypothesis” and financial 
reporting.  Accounting Horizons Vol. 16 No. 3 (September): 233-243. 
 
Boritz, J.E., and G. Liu. 2006. Determinants of the timeliness of quarterly reporting: 
evidence from Canadian firms. Working paper. University of Waterloo. 
 
Botosan, C.A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting 
Review Vol. 72, No. 3 (July): 323-349. 
 
Botosan, C.A. and M.A. Plumlee. 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and 
expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 40, No. 
1 (March): 21-40. 
 
Burns, N. and S. Kedia. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on 
misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 35-67. 
 78 
Bushee, B.J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D 
investment behavior. The Accounting Review Vol. 73, No.3 (July): 305-333. 
 
Callen, J.L., Livnat, J., and Segal, D. 2006. Accounting restatements: are they always 
bad news for investors?  Journal of Investing Vol.15 Issue 3 (Fall): p57-68. 
 
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., and Larcker, D.F. 1999. Corporate governance, chief 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics Vol. 51 Issue 3 (March): 371-406 
 
DellaVigna, S. and J. Pollet. 2005. Investor inattention, firm reaction, and Friday 
earnings announcements. Working paper. UC Berkeley and NBER. 
 
Desai, H., Hogan, C.E., and Wilkins, M.S. 2006. The reputational penalty for 
aggressive accounting: earnings restatements and management turnover. The 
Accounting Review Vol. 81 Issue 1 (January): 83-112. 
 
Efendi, J., Kinney, M., and Swanson, E.P. 2005. Can short sellers anticipate 
accounting restatements? Working paper. Texas A&M Univeristy. 
 
Efendi, J. Srivastava, A., and Swanson, E.P. 2007. Why do corporate managers 
misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other 
factors. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Ertimur, Y., Sletten, E., and Sunder, J. 2006. Voluntary disclosure strategy around 
IPO lockup expirations. Working paper. Northwestern University, Kellogg 
School of Management. 
 
Field, L., Lowry, M., and Shu, S. 2005. Does disclosure deter or trigger litigation? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39: 487-507. 
 
Fields, T.D., Lys, T.Z., and Vincent, L. 2001. Empirical research on accounting 
choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31: 255-307. 
 
Glass, Lewis & Co. Restatements trend alert: Getting it wrong the first time. March 
2, 2006. 
 
Glass, Lewis & Co. Restatements trend alert: The errors of their ways. February 27, 
2007. 
 
Gleason, C.A., Jenkins, N.T., and Johnson, W.B. 2004. Financial statement 
credibility: the contagion effects of accounting restatements. Working paper. 
University of Iowa. 
 79 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2006. Financial restatements: update of 
public trends, market impacts, and regulatory enforcement activities. 
www.gao.gov 
 
Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., and Rajgopal, S. 2005. The economic implications of 
corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3-73. 
 
Hartzell, J.C., and L.T. Starks. 2003. Institutional investors and executive 
compensation. The Journal of Finance. Vol. 58, Issue 6 (December): 2351-
2374. 
 
Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, 
and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, pp. 405-440. 
 
Hennes, K., Leone, A., and Miller, B. 2007. Management intent and CEO and CFO 
turnover around earnings restatements: evidence from the post-Enron era. 
Working paper. Penn State University. 
 
Hirschey, M., Palmrose, Z.V., and Scholz, S. 2005. Long-term market underreaction 
to accounting restatements. Working paper. University of Kansas. 
 
Hirshleifer, D. and S.H. Teoh. 2003. Limited attention, information disclosure, and 
financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, pp. 337-386. 
 
Hirst, D.E. and P.E. Hopkins. 1998. Comprehensive income reporting and analysts’ 
valuation judgments. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (Supplement): 47-
75. 
 
Hong, H., Lim, T., and Stein, J.C. 2000. Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst 
coverage, and the profitability of momentum strategies. The Journal of 
Finance Vol. LV, No.1 (February): 265-295. 
 
Hribar, P., Jenkins, N.T., and Wang, J. 2004. Institutional investors and accounting 
restatements. Working paper. Washington University in St. Louis. 
 
Huber, P. J. 1967. The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard 
conditions. Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical 
Statistics and Probability 1: 221-223. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management. Vol. 
34, No.1 (Spring): 5-19. 
 
 80 
Karamanou, I. and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit 
committees, and management earnings forecasts: an empirical analysis. 
Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 43 No.3 (June): 453-486. 
 
Kasznik, R. and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: management disclosures in 
the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review Vol. 70 No.1 
(January): 113-134. 
 
Kiefer, N.M. 1988. Economic duration data and hazard functions. Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol. XXVI (June): 646-679. 
 
Kothari, S.P., Shu, S., and Wysocki, P. 2005. Do managers withhold bad news? 
Working paper. MIT Sloan School of Management. 
 
Kravet, T. and T. Shevlin. 2006. Accounting restatements and information risk. 
Working paper.  The University of Washington. 
 
Lansford, B.N. 2006. Strategic coordination of good and bad news disclosures: the 
case of voluntary patent disclosures and negative earnings surprises. Working 
paper. Northwestern University. 
 
Li, O.Z. and Y. Zhang. 2006. Financial Restatement Announcements and Insider 
Trading. Working paper. University of Notre Dame. 
 
Lougee, B.A. and C.A. Marquardt. 2004. Earnings informativeness and strategic 
disclosure: an empirical examination of “pro forma” earnings. The 
Accounting Review Vol. 79 No.3: 769-795. 
 
Maines, L.A. and L.S. McDaniel. 2000. Effects of comprehensive-income 
characteristics on nonprofessional investors’ judgments: the role of financial-
statement presentation format. The Accounting Review. Vol. 75 No. 2 (April): 
179-207. 
 
Myers, J.N., Myers, L.A., Palmrose, Z.V., and Scholz, S. 2005. The length of 
auditor-client relationships and financial statement restatements. Working 
Paper. Texas A&M University. 
 
Palmrose, Z.V., Richardson, V.J., and Scholz, S. 2004. Determinants of market 
reactions to restatement announcements. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 37: 59-89. 
 
 81 
Patell, J.M. and M.A. Wolfson. 1982. Good news, bad enws, and the intraday timing 
of corporate disclosures. The Accounting Review Vol. LVII No.3 (July): 509-
527. 
 
Riedl, E.J. 2004. An examination of long-lived asset impairments. The Accounting 
Review Vol. 79 No.3 (July): 823-852. 
Rogers, W. H. 1993. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata 
Technical Bulletin 13: 19-23. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 2004. Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K 
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. 
 
Skinner, D.J. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting 
Research Vol. 32 No. 1 (Spring): 38-60. 
 
Srinivasan, S. 2005. Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: 
evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members. 
Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 43 No. 2 (May): 291-334. 
 
Stata Press. 2005. Stata survival analysis and epidemiological tables.  Reference 
manual, copyright 2005 by StataCorp LP: 120-163. 
 
Tse, S., and J.W. Tucker. 2006. Industry-wide dynamics in earnings warnings. 
Working paper. Texas A&M University. 
 
White, H. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica (May): 817-838. 
 
Zucca, L.J., and D.R. Campbell. 1992. A closer look at discretionary writedowns of 






Nathan Young Sharp was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 14, 1977.  
He is the son of Christopher and Karen Sharp.  Nate received Bachelors and Masters 
degrees in Accounting from Brigham Young University, graduating cum laude in 
August 2002.  From 1996 to 1998, Nate served a church mission in South Korea, and 
later became a Korean language instructor at the Missionary Training Center in 
Provo, Utah.  He also interned in accounting positions at Novell, Inc. and Arthur 
Andersen.  In August 2002, Nate entered the accounting Ph.D. program at The 
University of Texas at Austin.  Nate is the husband of Holly Carroll Sharp and the 
proud father of a daughter (Kennedy, 3) and a son (Jackson, 1). 
 
Permanent Address: 4228 S 2300 E, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84124 
 
 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
